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THE "NEXUS OF CONTRACTS"
CORPORATION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
William W. Bratton,Jr.t
Firms are bundles of unruly phenomena. They entail not just
production, but production by groups of people. Therefore, theories designed to contain and regularize the appearance of firms go
beyond concepts about economic production to articulate concepts
about communities. These concepts variously distinguish the individual and the group, usually according the interests of one or the
other greater moment.' They change from generation to generation and vary from theorist to theorist. No single comprehensive,
objective theory of the firm has taken hold. Firms still represent
2
different things to different observers.
Given this, it would seem unlikely that any new school of firm
theorists-even a new school armed with the methodological tools
of modern social science-could advance a radically altered theory
of the firm simultaneously possessing the virtues of accuracy and
political neutrality. Nevertheless, a theory of the firm now advanced
in corporate law literature, here termed the "new economic theory
of the firm," makes this claim.3 This theory explains corporate relat Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. This
article is dedicated to Drucilla Cornell, with appreciation for her belief in it. My thanks
to David Carlson, Arthur Jacobson, Ian Macneil, Paul Shupack, Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, and the participants in the Law and Economics Workshop of the University of
Toronto Faculty of Law, for commenting on earlier drafts, and to the Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance, Cardozo School of Law, for supporting
the project.
1 See Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173, 179-81 (1985).

The fundamental question in any theory of the firm is whether the appropriate unit
of analysis is the individual or the group. For a positive gloss on the firm and the problem of conflict between the individual and the group see VinogradoffJuridical Persons, 24
COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594 (1924) ("An adjustment between selfish and altruistic tendencies in social life is rendered possible by the fact that men are allied not only by moral
insight but by the necessities of business cooperation.").
2 Nevertheless corporate law presupposes some theoretical conception: "[W]e
must make some pre-legal cognitive peace with the phenomenon of the organization
before we can intelligibly tackle the question of its appropriate normative treatment."

M.

DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAU-

CRATIC SocIETY 27 (1986) (emphasis in original).
3
This phrase is used despite the usage of the title "modern theory of the firm" by
the theory's proponents. The "modern" title is not employed here for two reasons.

First, opponents of the new economic theory call their own ideas "modern." See Eisenberg, Nrew Modes of Discourse in Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 582
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tionships and structures in terms of contracting parties and transaction costs.
This construct originated among economists, 4 but came ready
made for use by legal scholars. Its apparent objectivity and formal
integrity promised the comfort and security of formalistic legal doctrine. Law and economics writers recast corporate law in its terms 5
and succeeded in reorienting corporate law discourse-cost analysis
of corporate relationships in terms of agency problems has become
commonplace. 6 At the same time, managerialist concepts subsumed
under the rubrics of "separation of ownership and control ' 7 and of
"corporate governance''8 have fallen from their position of general
(1984). Given this contest for the legitimating mantle of modernity, prudence dictates a
neutral position. Second; many of the component notions of the new economic theory
have been around since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and therefore are not
"modem." See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1482-85 (1989).
4
Economists proclaimed a major discovery. Professor Michael Jensen, one of the
theory's originators, has predicted that this infant "science of organizations" will cause a
..revolution ...in our knowledge about organizations" during the next two decades.
Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 50 AccT. REV. 319, 324 (1983).
5 See, e.g., Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The
ALI's Project andthe Independent Director,52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1984); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ.698 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook &
Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L.& ECON. 395 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting]; Fischel, The Appraisal
Remedy in CorporateLaw, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 875; Fischel, The Corporate Governance
.M'ovement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, Corporate Governance];
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857
(1984); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J.
49 (1982); Scott, CorporationLaw and the "American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project", 35 STAN. L.REV. 927 (1983); Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 959 (1980).

6 Several recent articles demonstrate the prevelance of these conceptions; they assume contractualism. On takeovers, see Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics:
A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295 (1986); Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical
Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985). On fiduciary duties and the possibility of contractual modification, see, e.g., Bebchuk, Limited ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraintson CharterAmendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989);
Coffee, No Exit? Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of
Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988).
7
See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967). Proponents of the "modern" theory have mounted the attack
on the Berle and Means thesis explicitly. See Corporationsand Private Property, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 235, 496 (1983).

8 Defenders of "separation of ownership and control" and of "corporate governance" within the community of corporate legal academics, practitioners, and policymakers have responded. See, e.g., American Law Institute's CorporateGovernance Project, 52 GEO.
WASH. L.REV. 495 (1984); The ALI's Corporate Governance Proposals: Law and Economics, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L.513 (1984).
The anti-managerialist response to the new economic theory has engaged it mostly
on matters of practice. For commentaries on basic theoretical assertions, see Clark,
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acceptance. 9
The new economic theory's core notion describes the firm as a
legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations
among individual factors of production.1 0 This notion has achieved
wide currency, showing up even in contexts in which the rest of the
theory has little or no influence.II Some have accorded this notion
the weight of scientific truth 12 : It has been received in the legal literature as an ontological discovery with immediate and significant implications for corporate law discourse.
Thus received, the nexus of contracts concept has been taken
Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNESS 55-79 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauger eds. 1985); Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Buxbaum, Corporate
Legitimacy, Economic Theory and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 515 (1984) (arguing that
economic analysis, though helpful, cannot be the sole basis for developing behavioral
rules); Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as FairnessJustificationsfor Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 47 (1987); DeMott, Beyond Aetaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE LJ. 879 (differentiating fiduciary and contract concepts).
9 Doctrine respecting the nature of the corporate firm and corporate governance
policies have changed substantially during the past twelve years or so. The extent of the
change can be grasped by recalling the earlier discussions., The anti-managerialists
dominated. The leading corporate law article was Professor Cary's attack on the Delaware legislature and courts and his call for limited Congressional intervention. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Popular
literature advocated more thorough-going federal controls. See R. NADER,J. SELIGMAN &
M.

GREEN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION

(1976). At that time, it seemed that some of

the anti-managerialists' suggested reforms might find their way into the law through the
medium of Rule lOb-5. See Cary, supra, at 699-700; Jennings, Federalization of Corporate
Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAw. 991, 1002-13 (1976); Rosenfeld, An Essay in
Support of the Seond Circuit'sDecisions in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Sante Fe Industries, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 127-34 (1976). Nobody seems to talk about federal chartering anymore. Today's anti-managerialist policy discourse looks to much less intense
models of legal control over corporate behavior. See Schwartz, Genesis: Panel Response, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 687, 688-91 (1987) (Professor Donald Schwartz commenting on

changes in the thrust of corporate law policy discussions between the late 1970s and
early 1980s).
10 This formulation draws on the original language ofJensen and Meckling. Jensen
& Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). See, e.g., Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983); Jensen, supra note 4, at 326. For restatements of the
concept in the legal literature, see e.g., Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at
1261-62; Kraakman, supra note 5, at 862; Scott, supra note 5, at 930.
11 See Macneil, EconomicAnalysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and the Needfor a
"Rich Classificatory Apparatus", 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018, 1026-27 n.27 (1980); Whitford,
Ian Macneils Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 545, 550 n. 16; see also
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1986) (corporate application of the contractual perspective in a more relational mode).
12
At least one polemicist writing within the framework of the new theory has

claimed the legitimacy of "organized theoretical and empirical processes." See Wolfson,
supra note 5, at 961. See also A. KAUFMAN & L. ZACHARIAS, THE PROBLEM OF THE CORPORATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL VALUES (University of MA, School of Management, Management Research Center Working Paper 1987).
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for more than it is worth. It has not been well understood even
though it has been well accepted. It embodies less an ontological
breakthrough than a shift of perspective. Characterized in a lawyers' terms, the point that the firm is a nexus of contracts is merely
an assertion, or a legal conclusion. Characterized in literary terms,
the point is a metaphor. Characterized in the technical terms of social science methodology, the point is a tautology-a statement true
by definition. 13 Unlike some economic theory, but like much legal
theory, the nexus of contracts (and much of the theory built on it)
resists empirical verification. As with legal theory, verification depends on the tester's characterizations of real world institutions and
relationships.1 4 Yet the legal academy has accorded the nexus of
contracts a status far higher than usual for the latest legal conclusion, metaphor, or tautology.
This article explains the overvaluation of the nexus of contracts
concept. It accounts for the new economic theory's success in the
legal academy and identifies its serious shortcomings. It further
proposes that we pursue a different contractual theory of the firm,
one which offers greater positive accuracy and normative
responsiveness.
The new economic theory's contractual perspective of corporations fares well in legal contexts because, in practice, corporate relationships do exhibit a significant basis of voluntary exchange. Its
contractual pictures better account for many aspects of relationships
between corporate managers and security holders than do competing managerialist pictures.' 5 By pushing corporate legal theory
away from a single-minded concern with "governance"-the positive law control of corporate hierarchies-the new economic theory
vindicates values widely held among those who deal with corporate
law.
But the new economic theory suffers from a single-mindedness
of its own, and, as a result, fails to offer a viable contractual theory
of the corporation. It employs a strictly delimited concept of contract congenial only to microeconomic methodology. Richer, alter13 Jensen, supra note 4, at 329. Identifying the idea at the core of new theory as a
tautology does not purport critique.
14
Id. at 332-33. It should be noted, however, that strategies for refutable implications are being pursued. Institutional theorists, for example, study real world arrangements and "match" transactions and governance structures. See Williamson, The Logic of
Economic Organization,4J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 65, 72-76 (1988);Joskow, Asset Specificity and
the Structure of Vertical Relationships:Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGAN. 95, 95-102
(1988).
15 These relational points are (a) the general acceptance of pro-managerial conceptions of management duties by state courts, despite decades of criticism by legal academics, and (b) the eclipse of managerialism by the rising market for corporate control.

See Bratton, supra note 3, at 1499-1500, 1520-25.
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native legal theories of contract fail to inform its pictures of the firm.
Consequently, it mischaracterizes corporate contracts, making normative and political assertions in the guise of ontological statements. At best, the new theorists' contractual firm makes a limited,
but still significant, heuristic contribution.
This article offers a different, more relational conception of the
contractual corporation, grounded in business practice. It includes
not only the discrete, arms-length exchanges that constitute the new
theorists' corporation, but also the managerialists' hierarchical
structures. The article asserts that a contractual theory of the corporation should not privilege either of these aspects of organizational life. Instead, their complex coexistence should be accepted as
a starting point and the theory should go on to describe their interrelationship. The exercise offers the possibility of a neutral basis for
corporate legal theory-a basis permitting the understanding of
normative issues in corporate law (if not their ultimate resolution) in
an atmosphere free of exogenous political imperatives. Corporate
law doctrine, which has been shifting between contracts, hierarchies,
and the state for more than a century, provides a useful starting
point in the endeavor to articulate this relational dynamic.
The article has four parts. Part I describes the new economic
theory. Parts II, III, and IV unpack it, isolating the nexus of contracts concept's ontological and political components in successive
theoretical contexts-first corporate legal theory, then political theory, and, finally, contract theory.
Part I states the new theory, drawing on the primary sources in
the economics literature. It places the theory in the larger context
of earlier legal and economic thinking, particularly the post-war
managerialist concept of the corporation. It distinguishes two variants of the theory. One, termed "neoclassical," deconstructs corporations into transactions hewing closely to the neoclassical
microeconomic model.' 6 The other, termed "institutional," recasts
the corporation as a series of contracts somewhat more relational in
7
character.)
Part II appraises the new economic theory using concepts from
corporate legal theory. This analysis extracts the concepts of the
firm operating deep within managerialism and contemporary corporate law doctrine and then compares these concepts with those of
the new economic theory. The comparison reveals a surprisingly
wide zone of present and potential congruence. At the same time,
16 See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text. The phrase "neoclassical
microeconomic model" is Professor Macneil's. See generally Macneil, supra note 11.
17 See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
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however, it shows that many of the new theory's assertions are too
closely tied to neoclassical microeconomic methodology to permit
their plausible transposition to the corporate law context.
Part III appraises the political component of the nexus of contracts, and rebuts the new economic theorists' proposition that freedom of contract is a corporate law absolute. The analysis reviews
the new theory against a range of propositions about government/corporate relations-specifically, the concession theory of the
corporate origin, the theory of sovereign coercion of contracts, and
"public-private" debate over the nature of the management corporation.18 It draws two conclusions. First, contrary to the new economic theory, the corporate contract remains an archetypical case of
limited contracting freedom. Second, corporate doctrine provides a
better basis than microeconomic theory for an accurate and flexible
positive political theory of the corporation.
Part IV appraises the "contract" in the nexus of contracts. It
shows that the new theory's positive picture of the management corporation overemphasizes the discrete contract and understates the
significance of hierarchical relations. It also shows that the new theorists lodge more legitimating power in contractual consent than it
plausibly can sustain. Again the analysis concludes that corporate
doctrine provides a better source of concepts for corporate legal
theory than microeconomics, in this case a theory of the corporate
contract.
I
THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS AND THE NEW ECONOMIC
THEORY OF THE FIRM

Proponents of the "nexus of contracts" tend to assert it flatly,
without explication. Yet the concept is not self-explanatory. Even
as they confront the claim that the concept represents a methodological and ontological breakthrough with radical implications for
corporate law, observers have trouble understanding what a corporate "nexus" is supposed to be.
Part I seeks to clarify the concept. It sets out the new economic
theory's basic assumptions in a wider institutional context, drawing
directly on the economics literature, rather than on the secondary
accounts in the law reviews. This exposition permits clear identifi18

In this article, the phrase "management corporation" denotes large mass-producing corporations and other large corporate entities, the shares of which are widely
held. The usual term, "public corporation," is avoided because it implies a position in
respect of a theory of the firm in question. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying
notes.
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cation of the economics underlying the new economic theory's legal
conclusions.
Contrasting the nexus of contracts concepts with the opposing
concepts their proponents sought to rebut permits better understanding. Therefore, this discussion begins with an account of
the managerialist conception of the corporation that prevailed in
legal and economic theory prior to the new economic theory's
appearance.
A.

The Managerialist Conception of the Corporate Firm

Since about 1930, discussions of corporate doctrine and policy
have been based on a particular management-centered conception
of large corporate entities. Until the new economic theory challenged it, this conception enjoyed such widespread acceptance that
it preempted most deeper inquiry into the nature of the firm in legal
theory. 19
The managerialist picture puts corporate management at the
strategic center of the large firm. Management, because of its expertise in organizing resources, possesses power and real discretion
in its exercise. Management's power has three aspects. First, management groups determine the processes of production and distribution. Second, management groups dominate enormous
hierarchical bureaucracies and exercise authority over all of those
lower in the hierarchy. Third, management-dominated corporate
entities impose externalities on those outside the entities. 2 0 In the
standard view, the corporate legal doctrine that emerged at the turn
2
of the century facilitated and protected management power. '
Many observers, here termed "anti-managerialists," acknowledged the accuracy of the consensus picture of management power,
but denied the legitimacy of management's position. They charged
in a three-part argument that management exercised its power without accountability. First, legal doctrine vests governing power of
the corporate entity in the board of directors subject to shareholder
vote. Second, management in fact controls the board. Third, the
financial community supports management. Therefore, management groups are unaccountable to higher authority.
Management's defenders, here termed "pro-managerialists,"
countered with a two part defense. First, expertise legitimated man19 This consensus picture also was widely held amongst economists as well. See
Bratton, supra note 3, at 1494-96.
20 See, e.g., A. BERLE, THE 20 m CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 31-37 (1954); R.
NADER, J. SELIGMAN & M. GREEN, supra note 9, at 62-65.
21
See, e.g.,J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 59, 62, 70, 82 (1970); Horwitz, supra note 1, at 181-83.

414

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74:407

agement authority; the management corporation functioned more
effectively than any alternative form.2 2 Second, they offered assurances of responsibility; managers, they insisted, were capable of
23
statesmanship.
The debate over the legitimacy of management power involved
disputes over the nature of the corporate firm at only one levelwhether the management corporation was public or private. The
anti-managerialists analogized the management corporation to government to demonstrate its public nature. If the corporation was
public, then uncontrolled management illegitimately wielded its
power and should be subjected to additional legal controls. 24 The
contrary assertion of the corporation's private nature affirmed the
legitimacy of the substantial discretion legally vested in
25
management.
The post-war law reviews contain extensive criticism of corporate doctrine for its pro-managerialist bias. This academic movement gathered force in the 1960s, eclipsing the pro-managerialist
approach based on managerial expertise. 2 6 Anti-managerialists
dominated the law reviews in the 1970s. 2 7 Despite this reversal,

state corporate law remained substantially pro-managerialist into
28
the 1980s.
Aside from the "public-private" disagreement, all participants
in the post-war pro- and anti-managerialist debate held common
managerialist assumptions about the nature of the corporate firm.
All saw the firm as a "structure" which gives rise to power relationships. All agreed that management dominates the structure by organizing subordinated factors of production. And all agreed that
management owes its position to its organizational expertise.
22
See generally W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH
MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM (1964).

23

(1959); R.

Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1297-98

(1984).
24

Like government, large corporations took actions affecting those outside the or-

ganization. Like government authorities, managers exercised their power by means of a
rationalized system of control and administration. Like government, the "public" firm
was a "political" entity. See Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 220 (E. Mason ed.) (1960).

25 The public-private debates of the pro- and anti-managerialists are covered in
more detail in the text accompanying notes 123-33 infra.
26 See Frug, supra note 23, at 1311.
27 See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatenent of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354 (1978); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Cary, supra note 9.

28 The literature on "transfers of control" provides a good example of this phenomenon. Academics argued strongly against the legitimacy of managers exchanging
control power for money. Only a few cases took up the idea. See Bratton, supra note 3, at
1498 n. 135.
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The Advent of the New Economic Theory

We can precisely date the advent of the new economic theory
with the publication of an article by Alchian and Demsetz in 1972.29
The appearance ofJensen and Meckling's well-known analysis of the
firm made 1976 the watershed year.30 These papers proposed a
picture of management interaction with factors of production quite
different from the managerialist picture. Ironically, they appeared
at the time the anti-managerialist movement in the law schools
3
achieved maximum influence. '
The nexus of contracts assertion, accepted in accordance with
its intended meaning, displaces the management-centered conception of the firm. It maintains that the firm is a legal fiction that
serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individial
factors of production. 32 Unlike the managerialist firm, the nexus of
contracts firm is not a hierarchy in which management determines
terms by fiat. Firms, said Alchian and Demsetz, have "no power of
fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action. [They do not differ] in the
slightest degree, from ordinary market contracting between any two
people."' 33 "Management," they concluded, usually described as a
hierarchical exercise, is really a continuous process of negotiation of
34
successive contracts.
The nexus of contracts concept opened up a new line of
microeconomic inquiry-the analysis of the internal functions of
firms within the assumptions and methodology of neoclassical
microeconomics. Before 1972, neoclassical microeconomists theorized only about markets. Their models explained coordination of
the use of resources and distribution of income by the price system 35 and accorded the firm "black box" status-a "production
function" deemed to follow profit considerations exclusively and
29 Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
30 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10. With it appeared the "nexus of contracts"
tautology. Significant substantially contemporaneous work on the theory of the firm
included 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); Smith, Economic Theory

and its Discontents, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 320 (1974).
31 See supra note 28.
32

This school also is called the "property rights" school. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra

note 30, at 251-52.
33 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 777. For example, the dissatisfied party
always can terminate its dealings with the firm.
34 Id. at 794.

35

See Chueng, The ContractualNature of the Finn, 26J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983). Neoclas-

sical microeconomists followed Adam Smith's dictum that the division of labor, and thus
the firm, marks the extent of the market. They did not look at production processes
inside the firm or at the contracting arrangements underlying them. See also Demsetz,
The Structure of Ownership and the Theoty of the Finn, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 377-78 (1983).
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behave as an entity in rational patterns no different from those of
36
human actors.
Neoclassical microeconomists accepted these limits on their
field of inquiry3 7 because they viewed internal corporate activities
with distaste. They perceived actions inside of firms as "engineering," functions of hierarchical structures, and, therefore, as unsuited to a discipline that studies markets. 38 This hierarchical
conception of internal firm affairs echoed the view prevalent in corporate law.
Ronald Coase made the earliest suggestion within
microeconomics that operations inside the firm could be described
as contract. In an essay published in 1937, 3 9 he explained firms and
markets as alternative forms of contracting, with the minimization of
transaction costs determining the choice between the two. Coase
saw the price system directing production through exchange transactions on the market, while coordinators directed protection within
firms. Firms, said Coase, exist where the costs of using the price
system to ascertain the price are too high. But this seminal work
achieved no noticeable influence until after 1970.40 Even then it in-

fluenced the two variants of the new economic theory in different
ways. Only the institutionalists took seriously Coase's distinction
4
between markets and firm hierarchies. '
The Alchian and Demsetz and Jensen and Meckling papers
opened a way around management hierarchies and succeeded in
bringing the interior of the firm to neoclassical microeconomics and
in bringing neoclassical microeconomics inside the firm. The nexus
36 Their models' assumptions of costless creation and enforcement of contracts and
of perfect information obviated the need to inquire into organizational details. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 325-26; see also Rosenberg, Comments on Robert Hessen, "The Modern
Corporationand Private Property: A Reappraisal," 26 J.L. & ECON. 291, 295 (1983).
37 For criticism of the neoclassical model see A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 489-90 (1977); McNulty, On the Nature
and Theory of Economic Organization: The Role of the Finn Reconsidered, 16 HIST. POL. ECON.
233, 240-41 (1984).
38 See Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 142-44
(1988);Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 306-07; Meckling, Values and the Choice of the
Individual in the Social Sciences, 112 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FUR VOLKWIRTSCHAFT

UND STATISTIK 545, 557 (1976); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197,
1220-21 (1984); Winter, On Coase, Competence, and the Coporation, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
163, 164-69 (1988).
maximization.

This distaste is part of a wider mistrust of nonexchange utility

39

See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).

40

Coase later said that his 1937 essay was "much cited but little used." See Coase,

Industrial Organization:A Proposalfor Research, in ECoNoMIC RESEARCH: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT:

POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

63 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972); see also, Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 19, 23 (1988).
41 See infra notes 56, 60 and accompanying text.
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of contracts concept provided the means of success. It pointed out a
new picture of the firm in which hierarchy is irrelevant. Under it,
neoclassical microeconomists could discuss organizations while remaining within the traditions of their discipline and without sullying
their hands with "engineering."
C.

The Neoclassical Variant
1. Basic Assumptions

The "neoclassical" variant of the new economic theory begins
with the nexus of contracts and then builds models of the management corporation that closely follow the neoclassical microeconomic
model and that draw on its body of assumptions. Its actors are rational, economic actors driven by their divergent self-interests, 4 2
and seeking to maximize values for themselves. They resourcefully
conceptualize and predict future courses of action effectively. 43 The
neoclassical theorists reconstruct the firm as the product of their
contracting behavior: Their contracts are equilibrium market contracts4 4 -instantaneous exchanges between maximizing parties.
The parties make complete choices, dealing with unknown factors in
45
the exchange price.
The neoclassicists also make assumptions about the contracting
process. They assume effective competition among the contracting
parties. They apply the principle of natural selection to successive
generations of the contracts. This follows from their assumption
that rational economic actors, consciously or not, solve problems in
the process of maximizing wealth. Given their level of capability
and intense competition, only optimal contracting strategies
46
survive.
2.

Basic Model

Within this framework, firm contracts take forms determined by
the imperative of reducing agency costs. Contracts that allocate risk
have winners and losers. Losers maximize their positions by taking
actions to avoid having to perform their promises fully-the theorists call this "shirking." Agency costs are the costs of shirking. Rational economic actors know all about possibilities for shirking and
charge the agency costs against their contracting partners ahead of
time. Given competition, the party who most reduces agency costs
42 Jensen, supra note 4, at 331; see also Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Finn,
88J. POL. ECON. 288, 289 (1980).
4 3 See Meckling, supra note 38, at 548-49.
44 See Jensen, supra note 4, at 327.
45 See Macneil, supra note 11, at 1022-23, 1039-40.
46 Jensen, supra note 4, at 322, 327.
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has the edge. And contract forms with the lowest costs survive. 4 7
Theorists apply this model to explain a range of corporate arrangements including such diverse phenomena as the positive law of relations among shareholders, boards of directors and officers; the
internal decisionmaking structures, policies, and procedures of corporate bureaucracies; and the contracts firms make with employees,
suppliers, and creditors.
In 1976 Jensen and Meckling published the most widely-circulated of the model's several treatments of shareholder-management
relations. 4 8 Their article set out the model's basic themes. Managers act as agents to shareholder principals. When securities are sold
publicly by management groups to outside shareholder principals,
the purchasing shareholders assume that the managers maximize
their own welfare and will bid down the price of the securities accordingly. Thus management bears the costs of its own misconduct
and has an incentive to discipline its own behavior. Management
increases self-control and thereby increases the selling price of the
corporation's securities by offering monitoring devices. These devices include such common features of the corporate landscape as
independent directors and accountants, and legal rules against self49
dealing.
Subsequent essays expand the Jensen and Meckling picture,
50
pointing out that pressures from the management labor market
and from the market for corporate control also impel management
to reduce agency costs. Commentators explain the received division
47

See, e.g., id. at 331-32; Fama &Jensen, supra note 10, at 301.

48

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 312-19.

49 This explanation has been widely employed in the law reviews. See e.g., Fischel,
Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Comnmon Stock, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 119,

128-29 (1987); Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 1262-65.
Alchian and Demsetz's predecessor article also explained corporate structure in
terms of agency costs. But it had a different focus. Jensen and Meckling built a financial
model-they set out a hypothetical close corporation in which an owner management
group sells equity to outsiders. Alchian and Demsetz built a production model, discussing shirking problems amongst individuals on production teams. The existence of management groups is explained as a function of shirking by input factors. Monitors (i.e.,
managers) must receive power to observe. Further arrangements are necessary since
managers themselves will shirk. Residual income shares reduce this incentive. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 781-82, 787-88.
50 Fama suggests that management labor markets provide the primary discipline by
(1) forcing greater responsiveness in rewarding performance (brought on by outside
market for management labor), (2) firm performance being reflected in outside opportu"nity wages (i.e., a firm performing well, vis-a-vis profits and agency costs, can demand
a
higher price in the management labor market), and (3) the incentive created by the internal firm market for lower managers to seek advantage over shirking co-workers. See
Fama, supra note 42, at 294-95; but see Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The
Separationof Ownership and Control, 26J. LAw & ECON. 367, 368 (1983) (taking the position

that wage discount cannot be taken into account in wage contracts ex ante).
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of authority between officers and director in terms of low cost information flow.5 1
Proponents introduced this basic model to legal theory as the
product of compelling science. But their science is not the kind that
survives successful testing of falsifiable propositions. The theory's
several basic assumptions-contract, rationality, the desire to maximize profits, competition, and survival of the fittest-state propositions as much political as empirical. Even accepted on their own
terms, these propositions leave open a wide area for discussion.
Within the model's parameters one can rationally construct various
and conflicting pictures of the firm. Perhaps the theory's proponents concur on no single point-other than the nexus of contracts
point itself. A single, detailed picture of the firm will not emerge
52
from the school.
The school's internal differences on who should bear the costs
of managerial shirking illustrate this indeterminacy. Jensen and
Meckling's present the most prevalent view that agency costs reduce
the value of the firm's equity, but the equity participations are
priced so as to force the agents-the firm's managers-to bear the
costs themselves. 53 Demsetz's counter model maintains that agency
relationships do not reduce the value of the firm's equity at all.
Rather, the costs flow through to the firm's customers and, given
competition in the product market, no firm suffering agency costs
could compete. Therefore, managerial on the job consumption will
persist only if it lowers the costs of production! 5 4 The differences in
the pictures stem from different versions of the assumption of competitive markets. Demsetz's world is more intensely competitive,
and the firm looks different as a result. 5 5
51
Fama and Jensen distinguish between decision management (the intiation and
implementation of decisions) and decision control (the ratification and monitoring of
decisions). These functions become divided because knowledge is widely spread in
complex organizations and this particular diffusion reduces costs. See Fama & Jensen,
supra note 10, at 302-05.
52
See Winter, supra note 38, at 163 ("...
I think we must acknowledge that the
present state is one of incoherence.").
53 See supra text accompanying note 47.
54 See Demsetz, supra note 35, at 379.
Demsetz has made another destabilizing suggestion more recently. Transaction
and monitoring cost analysis, he says, confine the inquiry too much. He suggests that
sights be expanded to include information cost considerations. Demsetz, supra note 38,
at 154.
55 The basic picture is undermined one step further by Klein's point that agency
costs cannot be presented for discounting when actors price securities. Klein, supra note
50, at 368 n.2. This picture differs from the generally accepted transactional model of
the new theory because of a slightly different assumption respecting the calculative capacity of rational economic actors.
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The Rebuttal of the ManagerialistPicture

The neoclassical variant's picture of the corporate firm contrasts with the managerialist picture and implicitly challenges its accuracy. In the neoclassical picture, the corporate entity-a
prominent figure in the managerialist picture-almost disappears.
It dissolves into disaggregated but interrelated transactions among
the participating human actors. Some transactions involve the fictive firm entity as a party, but only as a matter of convenience. The
"firm" has no precise boundaries; unlike legal academics, the neoclassicists have no interest in categorizing transactions as occurring
56
inside or outside of the firm.
The separation of ownership and control, a partial basis of
management power in the managerialist picture, disappears in the
new economic picture. Ownership becomes as irrelevant a concept
as the firm entity. The "firm" represents a mere series of contracts
joining inputs to produce output. Equity capital, the traditional
legal situs of ownership, devolves into one of many types of inputs, 57 and the body of corporate law becomes just part of the contract governing that input. Assuming that the fittest arrangements
survive, the contract's profit-sharing terms presumably effect an optimal sharing of risk. 58 The neoclassical picture, then, affords no
reason for government to intervene to protect shareholders.
Even though the neoclassical picture purports only to explain,
its operative assumptions give it a strong normative aspect. It implicitly justifies what it depicts by inserting a basis of arms-length
contractual negotiation. For example, extant customs of managerial
self-dealing must figure into the contract, or cost competition would
have eliminated them long ago. In the legal academy, the picture
counters the standing critique that corporate law establishes management power and protects self-interested management behavior.
Indeed the neoclassical picture denies altogether the existence of
the management power on which lawyers and legal academics have
long focused their analysis of corporate law.
D.

The Institutional Variant

Economists see "the theory of the firm" as a unitary discourse.
But, for purposes of law and economics, different exercises in theory have a materially different bearing. The neoclassical approach
56 See id. at 373; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1'ertical Integration,AppropriableRents, and
the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J. LAw & EcON. 297, 326 (1978);Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 10, at 311.
57 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 781-82.
58 Klein, supra note 50, at 370.
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should be distinguished from the "institutionalist" approach taken
by Oliver Williamson and some others. The institutionalists work
with different basic assumptions and produce a different model,
whose positive and normative aspects contrast less Sharply with that
of managerialist corporate legal theory.
1. Distinctions
Several significant distinctions can be drawn between the neoclassical and institutional variants. First, institutionalists recognize
the existence of the firm as a single maximizing unit; their firm entity represents more than an aggregate of transactions among maximizing individuals. 5 9 While comprised of contracts, the firm entity
constitutes a hierarchical "governance structure" significantly distinguishable from market contracting. 60 Institutionalists also follow
Coase by inquiring into differences between market and firm
organization.
Second, the institutionists' economic actor possesses a wider
repertory of human traits than the neoclassical counterpart. Specifically, the institutional contracting party suffers from "bounded rationality" and engages in "opportunistic conduct."'
Bounded
rationality gives the actor limited ability to solve problems. It prevents it from achieving the neoclassical actor's concrete risk analysis
and from making such complete choices. Opportunistic conduct
goes beyond the neoclassical actor's self-interested maximization to
"guile," untrustworthy behavior deemed "culpable" by a lawyer. 6 2
These human failings inform the institutionalist picture of the
firm contracting process. Actors know they cannot achieve complete exchanges in all situations. In incomplete exchange, they
leave terms open and consent to structures and processes to govern
the relationship's future. 63 Parties choose these "governance structures" over market exchanges to guard against appropriation:
59
60

See Macneil, supra note 11, at 1022-23.
See 0.

WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MAR-

KETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 294-97 (1985); Williamson, The Modern

Coporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19J. ECON. LIT. 1537, 1537-1546 (1981); see also Spence, The
Economics of Internal Organization: An Introduction, 6 BELL J. ECON. 163, 172 (1975) (affirming that, while the line between the firm and the market collapses to some extent,
the varieties of nonprice interactions on the marketplace, the hierachical nature of the
firm, and the control management exercises over resource allocation, makes them meaningfully different).
61 See generally Williamson, supra note 60, at 1544-45.
652 See Macneil, supra note 11, at 1023-24 n.20, for criticism of the concept of opportunistic conduct for its failure to include self-interested behavior unnecessarily injurious
to another party's interests-a behavior pattern included in the legal concept of "bad
faith."
3

See id. at 1043.
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where one or both parties' performance entails investment specific
to the transaction and opportunitism could threaten that investment, the parties invent a structure to mitigate that threat. Firm
organization, along with most other forms of long-term contracting,
64
represents such a mitigating transactional structure.
Other factors affect the institutionalists' transaction structures.
Some, like free rider problems and agency costs, also figure prominently into the neoclassicists' models. 6 5 But the institionalists also
consider nonrational influences, such as human attitudes. 6 6 Authority and ethics also enter into the parties' transactional solutions.
Fiat may provide the cheapest way to solve problems; co-operation
and reciprocity may reduce uncertainties, and hence costs, by caus67
ing expectations to converge.
These considerations give institutionalists a more thickly textured picture of the firm than the neoclassicists present. With its
hierarchies, planning failures, and bad faith conduct, the institutionalist picture often resembles the picture of the firm operative in corporate legal doctrine.
2.

Commonalities

We should not overstress the differences between the neoclassical and institutional variants however. Viewing the two approaches
together against the universe of alternative explanations of the firm,
they represent a substantially common point of view.
The institutionalists, like the neoclassicists, view the firm as a
construct of contract and explain its structural features as cost saving devices of transacting parties. Like the neoclassicists, they espouse a noninterventionist political perspective. As a form of
contract the institutionalists' firm is private rather than public. It
affords no apparent constructive role for public policy because the
institutionalists reject the idea that "government has any special
powers to reorganize the merits of organizational innovations
.68 Like the neoclassicists, their methodology delimits the
.
64
See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 53, at 298, 307, 319 (examples of firm
specific investments and transaction structures). See also 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 60,

at 298-99, 301-02 (analysis of corporate organization in terms of firm specific investment, bounded rationality and opportunistic conduct); Grossman & Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and LateralIntegration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1988)

(identifying ownership of an asset with residual rights of control over the asset); Williamson, supra note 57, at 1546; and Williamson, supra note 38, at 1209-12.
See Williamson, supra note 60, at 1547-48.
0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 30, at 256-57; 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 57, at 405.
0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 30, at 38.
(8
See Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.
LAW & ECON. 351, 361 (1983).
65
(5
67
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scope of their inquiry and analysis. Since transaction cost reduction
best explains private contracting patterns, they seek to explain firm
phenomena as means to reduce those costs; if no such functional
explanation appears at first, they keep looking.
II
THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS AND THE CORPORATE ENTITY
OF LEGAL THEORY

The central recurring question addressed by juridical theories
of the corporate firm is the "entity or aggregate" inquiry. This
question concerns the line of demarcation between the corporation
and the separate relationships in and around it. It asks to what extent the corporate firm constitutes a separate entity, possessing
characteristics of its own, separate from the characteristics of the
persons connected with it. Finding the existence of a meaningful
corporate entity raises further questions respecting the components
of its separate nature. One is whether the corporate firm is a real
thing, whether it exists, like a spiritual being, apart from the separate existences of the persons connected to it. Or is the firm entity
at most a reification-a construction of the minds of humans connected with the firm or otherwise aware of it? Even if the observer
concludes that only the reified firm entity exists, questions about the
source and character of the ideas constituting the reification still
arise. One question concerns personification of the firm-the appropriateness of modelling the reified entity as an economic and social actor with the behavior patterns of an individual. 69
A significant line of thinking, of which the neoclassical variant
of the new economic theory is the latest manifestation, applies
methodological individualism to answer the initial "entity or aggregate" query. This thinking denies the existence of a meaningful corporate entity. It finds the firm's separate characteristics to be
insignificant and attaches determinant significance to the relationship's aggregate parts. This approach distills a contractual essence
from the corporation.
Many different answers to these questions have been offered
throughout the history of American corporate law. 70 The first part
below sets out the configuration of answers that prevailed around
1980 when the nexus of contracts concept appeared in the legal
literature. The second part below contrasts this received legal conception with the nexus of contracts concept and discusses the implications of their joint presence in legal theory. This discussion
69

70

For a more extended discussion see M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 2, at 15-16.
See Bratton, supra note 3, at 1482-1500.
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identifies the incompatible methodologies of microeconomics and
law as the source of the boldest contrasts between the nexus of contracts concept and the legal conception. It filters out elements of
the nexus of contracts concept peculiar to economics and ill suited
to legal theory. It concludes that the legal conception of the firm, a
capacious collection of ideas, will function similarly, filtering out incompatible economics and then assimilating the residuum of the
nexus of contracts into legal theory. The ultimate benefit will be
heightened sensitivity to the relational elements that make up the
normative issues in corporate law.
A.

Conceptions of the Nature of the Firm in Legal Theory

The economists who first formulated the nexus of contracts
conception announced a teaching mission. The world needed to be
shown that organizations have neither consciousness nor independent rationality; the new theory would dispel the tendency to regard
organizations as persons. 7 ' But the legal academy had no urgent
need for the economists' lesson because legal theory had assimilated it almost a half-century before.
1.

The Nineteenth Century Consensus Pictureand the Turn-of-theCentury Dispute

During the nineteenth century, a consensus picture prevailed
which accorded the corporate entity a reified existence. This picture, however, simultaneously accorded private contract the generative economic role in corporate life. The corporate entity
represented a state-created juridical structure only-a "legal fiction" or an "artificial entity." The consensus picture conceptually
distinguished this juridical form from the conduct of business. Corporate business, like that conducted by individuals and partner72
ships, was a contractual aggregate.
These concepts lost influence near the turn of the century.
Firm entities gained prominence in the economic and social landscape as management corporations appeared. Intensive discussion
of the nature of the corporate firm ensued, lasting until the 1920s.
A rearguard of observers hostile to the new mass-producing entities
challenged traditional doctrinal notions by introducing contractual,
disaggregated conceptions of the firm. But theorists with the more
prominent voices attacked the traditional doctrine from the other
side, affirming the entity's economic and social existence as well as
SeeJensen, supra note 4, at 327.
See Bratton, supra note 3, at 1502-08 (more complete description of nineteenth
century doctrine on the nature of the firm).
71
72
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its juridical status. These academics, influenced by European theories of group existence, 73 advanced an organic theory: the corporation was an entity and was real. Group will and group loyalty
combined in corporate life to transcend the beings of the individual
participants. It created a new being with a will of its own. These
transcendental "realist" 74 notions, supported the new management
75
interest.
This "realist" theory attracted opponents, who rebutted it with
complete success during the 1920s. 7 6 The opponent's propositions
about the nature of the firm provided the basis for a new consensus
view and became the basic assumptions underlying corporate discourse during the managerialist period that began around 1930.
2.

The Mid-Twentieth Century Consensus Picture

The "anti-realist" consensus picture emphasizes the firm's aggregate parts by describing the firm's nature as a result of the actions of human actors. 77 It explains habitual references to
corporations as "persons," as a matter of convenience only. 78 The
corporate entity remains, even so. It retains a cognizable social reality even as it returns to the diminished status of a reification. 79 The
firm, like other institutions, retains a meaningful existence as a separate entity because it carries on while individuals, with their narrower interests and whims, come and go. 80 This reified entity
receives separate substantive content from the "common purpose"
73
The most influential European was Gierke. See Radin, The Endless Problem of CorporatePersonality,32 CoLum. L. REv. 643, 663-64 (1932); Dewey, The Historic Background of
Corporate Legal Personality,35 YALE LJ. 655, 658-59 (1926); Vinogradoff, supra note 1, at
595, 602. See also Horwitz, supra note 1 (recent retrospective of the turn of the century
discourse).
74
They are termed "realist" because they hold the firm to be a "real," albeit transcendental thing. This "corporate realism" therefore has no conceptual relation to
"legal realism."
75
Horwitz posits a cause and effect relationship between realist theory and the success of the managerialists. See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 176, 224. For criticism of this
position, see Bratton, supra note 3, at 1511-13.
76
See generally Dewey, supra note 73; Radin, supra note 70; Vinogradoff, supra note 1.
Little discussion of corporate realism appears in American law reviews after the
1920s. Indeed, with the close of the debate over realism, extended discussion of the
nature of the firm disappears from the law reviews altogether. Apparently, those dealing
with corporate law found further discussions unnecessary.
77
Dewey, supra note 73, at 660-61. Berle assisted in the transition of anti-realist
ideas into conventional wisdom. See A. KAUFMAN & L. ZACHARIAS, supra note 12.
78
See Radin, supra note 73, at 664.
79
Dewey, supra note 73, at 673.
80 Dan-Cohen, emphasizing the meaningful existence of the firm by its lifespan,
describes the corporation as an "intelligent machine." M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 2, at
49.
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of its participants.8 1 While collective, this entity is not collectivistit enjoys a primarily functional existence. It provides a means to the
end of production, setting the common goals of the participants
apart from those of the rest of the world. It also facilitates decisionmaking and conflict resolution within the group and external action
in the name of the group.
This "anti-realist" concept of the firm complemented the concept operative in twentieth century corporate doctrine. In the doctrine, the corporation has held reified status all along. The doctrine
embraces a range of entity and aggregate notions and offers two
models of the corporation. One presents the corporation as a separate entity to which managers owe duties; the other presents the
corporation as an aggregate wherein managers owe duties directly
to shareholder principals. 8 2 The facts of the situation, rather than
some theoretical essence derived ex ante, determine the choice be83
tween the entity or aggregate models in any given situation.
The "anti-realist" conception of the corporation continues to
inform corporate law commentary.8 4 Commentators differ over
matters of degree, filling in the entity reification with differing configurations of group objectives, values, and actions. But they all
subscribe to the picture's broad ontological outlines. Even as the
commentator's political views vary over the contemporary spectrum,
they share an individualistic conception of corporations. Under this
conception, the group exists to advance individual objectives.
Although the commentators recognize the existence of group and
community values, they deny them as ends in themselves. 8 5 For example, some legal scholarship calls for self-sacrifice in business relationships as an ethical proposition. This approach invariably
preconditions the self-sacrifice on reciprocity in the relationship;
duties to sacrifice always relate in some way to actual or potential
returns of some kind.8 6 The value of reciprocity assures recognition
of the sacrificing party's interests.8 7 Contrariwise, the beneficiary
81

1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 4 (5th ed. 1953); Vino-

gradoff, supra note I, at 603.
82 Interplay between the two conceptions pervades corporate doctrine. The doctrinal division of power between shareholders and directors provides a particularly sharp
contrast. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATION 85-94 (1976).
83
Br.atton, supra note 3, at 1508-10.
84
See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE

BEHAVIOR 6-7, 46, 48, 57 (1975); Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 527; Klein, The Modern Business Organization:Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1982).
85 While they have concerned themselves with the redistributing corporate power,
they assumed effective creation of wealth by corporations in pursuing this end.
86 See generally Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidaci v, 96
ETHICS 567 (1986).
87
Macneil, one of the more organicist writers on business relations in the contem-
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never gets something for nothing.
Contemporary commentators tend to look past the doctrinal
corporation to constitutive contractual relationships. 8 8 But this disregard of doctrinal barriers need not entail disregard of the entity
notion. In fact, contemporary contract theory which isolates the values constitutive of long term contractual relationships-"relational"
contract theory-permits the contents of the entity reification to be
identified more clearly. Relational contract theory may account for
the entity notion's prevalence and persistence. The entity idea exists and matters because of heightened interdependence among the
parties participating in corporate ventures and institutions. Their
positions demand ongoing cooperation, and the entity reification
embodies and strengthens common goals, such as the preservation
89
of the relationship, that enhance cooperation.
B.

The Nexus of Contracts Concept and Received Legal
Theory
1. Similarities

The nexus of contracts concept challenges many details of the
generally accepted picture of the corporation, but it does not challenge that picture's fundamental outline. It does not assert that firm
entities do not exist. Instead, it modifies the traditional juridical
theme of the corporation as a combination of reified entity and aggregate parts, taking many directions already followed in twentieth
century legal theory. It reinforces the proclivity to look through the
entity to constitutive contractual relations, the proclivity to look at
the entity reification as a means to the end of wealth creation, and
the proclivity to resist the introduction of organicist thinking in
business contexts.
The institutionalist picture reinforces the generally accepted
picture with particular force. Even though the institutionalists insist
that cost reduction explains all firm phenomena, in the end they approximate the received legal picture. 90 They recognize the value of
the firm reification, in effect offering cost reduction as the explanaporary legal academy, emphasizes reciprocity. See, e.g., I.

MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 44-47 (1980).

88 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 84, at 1523. This approach, best termed relationalism,
discards explanations and classifications in received doctrinal terms in favor of transactional analysis. Macneil's work during the 1970s provided the groundwork. See generally I.
MACNEIL, supra note 87.
89 See, e.g., I. MACNEIL, supra note 87, at 30; Macneil, Values in Contract:Internal and
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340, 362-63 (1983).
90 For contrast between a broader relational approach and the cost-reductive approach of the institutionalists, compare Macneil, supra note 11, at 1025 n.26, with Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J. LAW & ECON.
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tion for the appearance of the entity notion in legal doctrine. 9 1
Their entity has a quantifiable value in the firm-specific knowledge
of its employees. 92 They associate cooperative and other collective
values with the entity. 9 3 Their recognition of bad faith, incompetent
actors, and openness to group values find easy analogues in conventional doctrinal concepts. The institutionalist firm easily could enter
the legal mainstream, perhaps disappearing somewhere within it.
2.

Contrasts

Of course, the new economic theory does not merely reinforce
the received legal picture. The institutional variant, while integrating into the juridical landscape with relative ease, reduces it and
removes all details not consonant with the methodology of cost reduction. The neoclassical variant poses even more significant
contradictions.
The neoclassical theory conflicts with received legal theory by
94
recasting firm relations in terms of discrete, bilateral contracts.
The neoclassical theory deemphasizes the entity, attempting to strip
the reification of virtually all substantive content. The neoclassical
firm entity becomes a constructed reference point, bearing a relation to the economic substance of firm life analogous to the relation
of a punctuation mark to the words on a written page. To find the
firm's essence, the theory looks solely to the behavior of individual
economic actors. Unlike reifications, individuals produce goods and
services; through their actions the firm performs its essential cost
functions.
Political ideals inform the neoclassicists' firm. They envision an
environment of complete individual integrity and then recast group
related thoughts and feelings in individual terms. As a result, they
wring the community values from the firm entity even as they affirm
the legitimacy of much of the legal landscape. Under standard legal
theory, the firm reification embodies group interests which may supersede those of the individual participants in given situations. The
neoclassicists recognize these values but recharacterize them as in233, 236 (1979). See also 0. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: FIRMS, MARKETS
103-30 (1986).
91 See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 5, at 862-63 (entity liability shifts risks to efficient
risk bearers).
92
Klein, supra note 50, at 374. Firm-specific knowledge is knowledge possessed by
employees of the firm which is particular to the operation of that firm and cannot translate usefully to other firms. Its value lies in its ability to lower operating costs when
employees are familiar with the procedures peculiar to that firm.
93 See supra text accompanying note 64.
94 See Masten, A Legal Basisfor the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988) (comparing
legal doctrine regarding employment with doctrine governing commercial contracts).
AND POLICY CONTROL
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strumental devices directly serving the rational actor's self-interested ends. Cooperation becomes a means to the end of
productivity. Team spirit arises not because of any inherent value
or because of psychological rewards of participation in group effort,
but because it increases the pay off for individuals. Corporate loyalty benefits the individual by helping him overcome self-destructive
tendencies to indolence. 95 No other values exist in group economic
life other than self-interested rationality.
Despite themselves, the neoclassicists fail to denude the firm
reification of all content. Nexuses, like punctuation marks and other
formal devices, bear on substance. Meckling, for example, speaks
of the "fusion" and "coalescence" of rational economic actors into
firms;96 "fusing" and "coalescing" actors, like merging and combining companies, emerge altered. Alchian and Demsetz model the
firm as a means to the end of team production centered on management. Their model gives the reification significant content by infusing it with the functions of the management team. 9 7 Jensen notes
that the economic counterpart of the entity-based firm theory, the
neoclassical "black box" conception, remains useful in some contexts. 98 He, in effect, recognizes that the entity performs many functions inadequately described by cost reduction. Viewing the firm as
an actor in the neoclassical marketplace doing things that markets
cannot do demonstrates some of these entity functions. For example, firms, whether sole proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations serve as repositories of productive knowledge. 99 They
determine output and price levels in response to changes in data
and then determine the quality of products before turning them
over to the market for evaluation.' 00 From the perspective of the
outside marketplace, these actors are entities.1° '

95 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 777, 790-91 (formulating these
characterizations).
96 See Meckling, supra note 37, at 559.
97 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 787-88. Any elements of the entity not
explained are thrown into a person called the "owner" who possesses a bundle of
rights. Id. at 783. Demsetz recently went so far as to mention "cooperative efforts,"
"continuity of association," and "reliance on direction," as firm characteristics. Demsetz, supra note 38, at 156.
98 SeeJensen, supra note 4, at 328.
99 Winter, supra note 38, at 169.
100 See McNulty, supra note 37, at 245-47, 251-52.
101 Contemporary economic literature from outside the discourse of the new theory
of the firm similarly affirms the proposition that group life has a cognizable social reality.
Hayek's comments on the dangers posed by individuals grouped in organizations stand
out for their affirmation of the social reality of the structures of thought that make up
organizational entities. See 3 F. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
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Incompatibilities

The neoclassical variant contradicts legal theory as a result of
its methodological strictures and extreme individualism. For example, the neoclassicists' methodology makes easy their ultra-individualistic dismissal of altruism as a delusion. They recognize only
rational economic actors. But legal theorists work from a different
concept of the individual; they recognize more holistically constituted actors. These actors both subscribe to and act subject to community values of giving and cooperation. 10 2 Of course, legal
scholars deemphasize these communitarian characteristics and envision actors closely resembling those employed by the neoclassicists,
when considering some situations, particularly business relationships. Like economists, they sometimes treat altruism as a contracting device and as a means to the end of wealth creation.' 0 3 But,
even in business relationships, they recognize no principles that bar
them from accounting for altruism as a value rather than an instrument manipulated by self-interested individuals.
So long as legal theory recognizes the possibility of altruism
and the related values of cooperation and shared goals, and so long
as it associates them with the firm entity, its conception of the firm
will exclude the neoclassicists' picture of a contentless firm reification. Values springing from group endeavor give the entity substantive and normative content. They prevent the larger relation from
disaggregating into a neoclassical bundle of discrete transactions.
Because these values have an ingrained character, their resistance to
the neoclassical conception should endure.
4. Assimilation
This discussion of incompatibility does not suggest that no neoclassical conceptions will enter legal theory. Nor does it suggest
that the new economic theory will bring no improvements to corporate law. But, so long as legal theory resists the core concept of the
90 (1979). According to Hayek, organizations derive their
power from the moral support of collective action and feelings of group loyalty. Id.
For a very different example making a similar point see A. CHANDLER, supra note 37,
at 8. Writing about the emergence of the modern management structure, Chandler
notes that the management hierarchy became a source of permanence that "took on a
life of its own." Id.
102
Sometimes these values affect the actors as internal ethical drives and sometimes
they affect the actors as objectified community norms.
103 See, e.g., Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2023 (1985). Kronman describes a "union" concept, a contractual arrangement of parties
seeking to reduce divergence by promoting a spirit of fellow-feeling. The parties establish routines to reinforce altruism. Altruism is thus a strategy to reduce the risks of
nonsimultaneous exchange, rather than a community value imposed on contracting parties by an outside agency.
ORDER OF X FREE PEOPLE
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contentless reification, neoclassical conceptions will fail to trans10 4
form legal perspectives in any fundamental way.
The combined influence of institutional and neoclassical literature should bring improvement by encouraging more determinedly
relational applications of corporate doctrine. Through this influence, the doctrine's structures and norms will be applied with sensitivity to the many distinguishing characteristics of different
corporate contracts. Imagine a close corporation actually comprised of arms-length discrete contracts along the lines of the enterprise Jensen and Meckling hypothesized in their seminal article.
Crude application of traditional corporate doctrine might impose
the values of altruism and cooperation. Given a relational approach,
a legal decisionmaker would instead employ a normative model incorporating the individualistic values of discrete contracting, avoiding doctrine built on entity conceptions.
A relational approach, however, results in quick and clear normative signals only when confronting neatly hypothesized firms and
issues. In more complicated real world situations, it serves the
lesser (but still significant) function of delineating normative issues
more clearly. Viewing the real world management corporation relationally, with due regard to the new economic theory's conceptions,
it represents a complex of contracts, some discrete and some relational. Corporate doctrine does not conclusively fix the appropriate
characterization of even the more common contracts; stock and
bond ownership may appear both ways, given public trading markets. The holder enters a relationship with the firm through a discrete contract. The holder can exit through a discrete contract.
Therefore, norms appropriate for discrete contracts may plausibly
govern the holder's relationship to the other participants in the
firm. 0 5 On the other hand, the focus of the picture of the stock and
bondholders' relationship to the rest of the corporation can shift
from the individual stock or bondholder to encompass the entire
group of security holders. The moment this shift to the "entity"
occurs, relational values spring from the contract. Conflicts arise
between discrete and relational aspects of other intrafirm contracts,
especially the employment terms of its managers and employees.
Corporate doctrine, in operation, hedges between the relationships'
discrete and relational aspects, allowing the determination of the
dominant model to depend on concrete fact patterns.
104

Such a transposition, however, may enervate and distort the new economic

theory.
105
See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 2, at 24 (considerations of self-interest can argue
against active participation in the internal decisionmaking of an organization); A.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY

(1970).
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Enhanced relational sensitivity in corporate law would not make
these normative decisions easier. It would introduce no formulaic
solutions for general acceptance and application. Instead, it would
bestow the doctrine with the heightened awareness that results from
a formal admission that the situation is ambiguous. It thereby
would permit a range of theoretical conceptions of firms (and associated legal approaches) to bear on the contracting behavior of particular parties and particular types of businesses. It also would
accord theoretical sanction to the coexistence of different corporate
law approaches-entity-based approaches presupposing high degrees of interdependence, 0 6 and aggregate-based approaches modelled on the arms length sale of goods contract. All firms would be
recognized as entities, but group-based norms would apply in given
instances with intensities varying with the particular transacting
patterns.
III
THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE CORPORATE FIRM

The nexus of contracts assertion has a political aspect. The assertion matches the firm's economic substance with individual actors
and their respective contracts and classifies the firm's state created
components as fictions. The assertion thereby suggests limits on
the state's legitimate role in the corporate firm's life.
This Part critically appraises this political component. First, it
juxtaposes politics of the new economic theory with the wider range
of current theory respecting the relations of the corporation and the
state. This exercise shows that the new economic theorists have
misstated materially the political issue underlying corporate law.
They frame the issue as an absolute choice between the firm as a
contract and the firm as a concession of sovereign authority. In fact,
concession concepts are outmoded. More flexible, and enduring
concepts inform contemporary jurisprudence of an anti-managerial
and proregulatory disposition. The new theorists' picture of absolute political rights and wrongs dissolves upon restating the issue in
terms of the public or private heuristic long prevalent in theoretical
discourse of the political status of the firm. In the "public-private"
framework, political questions become matters of degree resolved
according to variant political dispositions of different observers.
Second, the discussion draws on corporate doctrine for an alternative approach to the politics of corporate law. The theories
I06

See Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L. REV. 478, 490,

496-99 (1981) (association of intense fiduciary duties with entity notions).
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jockey against each other to advance their respective state or individual perspectives. Corporate doctrine, in contrast, moves more
flexibly. It declares a limit on freedom of contract within corporations. Beyond that, it incorporates an open-ended view of state-corporate relations, facilitating an ongoing political accommodation
between the collective interests manifested by the state and the individual interests of contracting parties.
A.

Contract or Concession
1. The Nexus of Contracts versus Concession Theory

Commentary grounded in the nexus of contracts concept declares "contract or concession" to be the political issue regarding
the theory of the firm.' 0 7 It asserts that advocates of government
regulation subscribe to a concession theory of the corporation's origin 10 8 and then draws on the nexus of contracts to rebut concession
theory.
This commentary renders concession theory as follows: The
corporation is a creature of the state. The state gives the corporation life and concedes to it the special privileges of entity status,
perpetual existence, and limited liability. 10 9 In exchange, corporate
actors owe services to the public good. The state must regulate corporations to enforce this obligation to reciprocate. Concession theory appears together with entity conceptions of the corporation, 110
and with organicist conceptions of community interests. I'
The nexus of contracts assertion rebuts this picture of concession theory. The contractual firm comprises voluntarily associating
sovereign individuals. They enjoy no special state privilege. Instead, they exercise their individual right to contract. The contractual corporation pursues no public purpose dictated by virtue of its
creation, it pursues the private purposes of contracting parties.12
Given a firm entity reduced to a contentless reference point, nothing of substance remains for the state to add by concession to these
contracts.
This neat argument wins some points, but it fails to win any
points worth making. No one advocates the theory it rebuts. A half107 The "debate" is mostly a figment of the imagination of Robert Hessen. See infra
notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
108 See R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 3-33 (1979); Hessen, A New

Concept of Corporations: A Contractualand Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 1327,
1327-28 (1979); Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to Wlhat End?, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 534, 535 (1984).
109 Hessen, supra note 108, at 1327, 1330.
110
Romano, Metapolitics and CoporateLaw Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 933 (1984).
M
Id. at 933-34.
112 Id. at 933-34.
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century has elapsed since advocates of government regulation of
corporations emphasized concession theory. Strangely, its recent
resurrection as a foil for the new economic theory has passed into
the discourse without criticism. 1 13 No one, however, seems to step
forward to join the debate actively on the concession side. Meanwhile, the unchallenged presence of this one-sided argument obscures the new economic theory's political vulnerabilities. The
following discussion clarifies the place of concession theory by outlining its history and showing its disappearance as a focal point of
American corporate law discourse.
2.

The HistoricalDecline of Concession Theory

The new economic theorists correctly recognize that the basic
doctrinal assertion of concession theory is that corporations must
derive positive authority from the state. 14 Sovereigns have asserted
this requirement in different guises since Roman times, 1 5 in order
to suppress potential rival agglomerations of power. 1 16 Significantly, no sovereign in the English speaking world has asserted concession theory with complete success for several centuries. From
the sixteenth until the eighteenth century, the British government
maintained that only the state could create an artificial person. But
the lawyers of the time, like today's new economic theorists, resisted
departures from the scheme of natural persons in private dealings
and advanced an opposing contractual conception of the firm. They
circumvented concession doctrine by devising structures for the
conduct of business affairs, such as the trust and thejoint stock company, 117 that worked without sovereign participation."18
In the United States, concession theory enjoyed vitality during
the first half of the nineteenth century. This was the special charter
113 See, e.g., M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 2, at 200; Fischel, Corporate Governance, supra
note 5, at 1273 n.44; Karmel, supra note 106, at 535 n.5; Romano, supra note 108, at 93335; cf. Frug, supra note 23, at 1305-06 n.82, 1307 n.90 (correctly noting that Hessen
revives a nineteenth century perspective).
114 See Dewey, supra note 73, at 666; Vinogradoff, supra note 1, at 600-0 1.
1 15
R. SAVIGNY,JURAL RELATIONS § 88 (W. Rattigan trans. 1888); R. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES § 38 (J. Ledlie trans. 1940).

116 Dewey, supra note 73, at 666; Vinogradoff, supra note 1, at 600-0 1.
1'7 See Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty, and Associations in the
Common Law, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 599, 644-60 (1980). Parliament tried to put a stop to
the joint-stock company with the Bubble Act of 1720 which forbade the transfer of
shares in joint stock companies. See id. at 662.
118
British lawyers enjoyed such success that by 1800 partnerships and joint stock
companies were as much utilized as vehicles for the raising of capital as specially
chartered corporations. During the eighteeth century, the British parliament only
chartered some half dozen corporations for manufacturing. See Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MODERN CORPORATION
5-6 (D. Grunewald & H. Bass eds. 1966).
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phase of American corporate history, during which concession theory accurately described the practice of corporate creation. It circulated in tandem with the "legal fiction" conception of the nature of
the firm;1 1 9 the early nineteenth century corporation was an entity
that was a state-created reification. But public law premises of
corporateness failed to achieve absolute adherence even during this
period. Contractual notions of corporateness also circulated, as the
most famous corporate law case of the time, Dartmouth College v.
Woodward 120 demonstrates.
Concession theory lost its vitality as general incorporation laws
proliferated. Once equal and substantially free access to the corporate form became the norm, 2 1 the notion of "concession" no
longer described the practice of incorporation. The doctrine declined gradually; the state continued to figure into corporate crea12 2
tion, and the doctrine continued to appear in law books.
By the time the dispute between realists and anti-realists was
resolved during the late 1920s, the constitutive imagery of concession theory no longer made practical sense. The only corporate
doctrine supporting concession theory was the requirement of filing
with the state. To twentieth century observers this was a technicality. States incorporated businesses as a ministerial matter; they did
19 See Dewey, supra note 73, at 667-68; Vinogradoff, supra note 1, at 600.
120
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). For discussion of this case's place in the
history of theory of the firm, see Note, The Personificationof the Business Corporationin American Law, 54 U. CM. L. REv. 1441, 1447-55 (1987).
121 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 181, 184; Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1982) [hereinafter Horwitz, Public/Private].
122
With no sovereign actively asserting it in accordance with its original purpose,
concession theory fell into manipulating hands in the complex of late nineteenth century
corporate law discussions. From one perspective, concession theory supported expanded management power. If the corporate form was a concession of authority, now
invested by means of the ministerial act of state incorporation under the general incorporation statutes, then the state conceded quite a bit of authority. Dewey, supra note 73,
at 667-68. Because the corporation was only a "legal fiction," its individual interest
holders had cognizable rights available for simultaneous assertion against government
regulation from outside of business corporation law. Concession theory also figured
into the debate between realists and anti-realists over the nature of the firm. Here concession theory was turned against management by anti-managerialist individualists.
Viewed in the abstract, a concession theory of corporate origin opposes both the antirealists' contractual conception and realists' natural entity conception. Unlike concession theory, both of these approaches advance the notion that the corporation is a normal and natural mode of doing business rather than a special privilege. The managerial
interests found realism the most congenial alternative. As masters of the real entities
they stood to gain to the extent that the realist theory produced rights for corporate
persons. Individualists uncomfortable with managerial bureaucratic power-centers
countered by embracing the old concession and artificial entity doctrines. While entailing something less than a regime of absolute free contract, these doctrines at least
shared the individualist methodological premise that the individual is the starting point
of legal and political theory. See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 179-83. Compounding the
irony, anti-individualist socialists joined with managerialists in embracing realism.
1
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not "breathe life" into them. As Berle explained, were the law to
decree that the corporations no longer existed, they would carry on
anyway. 12 3 Incorporating states no longer endowed businesses with
sovereignty.' 2 4 In practice, corporations operated by means of contract and agency relationships. Certainly management hierarchies
exercised unilateral power, but state action was not involved.
Although reified rather than real to twentieth century taste, the corporation no longer appeared the state-created "legal fiction" of the
early nineteenth century. The observers looked at the practice and
traced the reification to the firm's human participants. 25 Twentieth
26
century corporate doctrine reflects these underlying conceptions.
B.

The Firm According to Mid-Twentieth Century AntiManagerialists: The Public Product of Sovereign
Coercion
1.

The Public-PrivateDistinction and the Management Corporation

Discussions of sovereign involvement in corporate life continued after concession theory disappeared. These discussions centered on theories about the public or private nature of institutions.
These theories achieved prominence in American legal thinking in
the nineteenth century. 12 7 They manifest a liberal individualist
political outlook. This perspective exalts neutrality with respect to
individual visions of the good, maximum autonomy for each individual, and strict limitations on social obligations to achieve the minimum necessary for social cooperation.' 28 The law serves the ideal
123

124

A. BERLE, supra note 20, at 18.
See 1 A. DEWING, supra note 81, at 11 (realistic critique of the components of

concession doctrine). Dewing offers two broader theoretical justifications for concession doctrine. First, the sovereign articulates the common purposes of the corporation's
constituent parties. Id. This justification, of course, was as anachronistic as the doctrine. The state had withdrawn from the business of contributing concepts to governing
corporate documents with the spread of general incorporation. Second, the state exercises final control in all relationships of its inhabitants, id. at 12, but this serves less as a
justification for concession doctrine than as the theoretical impetus behind the asssertion that the corporation is "public" rather than "private." See infra text accompanying
notes 130-41.
125

See supra text accompanying note 112.

126

As an example, consider the post-war proliferation of contractual modifications

of the structures of close corporations. See generally O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to
ParticularBusiness Situations: Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1956). See also
Bratton, Book Review, 1985 DUKE LJ. 237, 255-59 (reviewing R. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1984)).
127 Horwitz, Public/Private,supra note 121, at 1423.
128 See Rosenfeld, Contract andJustice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and

Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 772, 794-95 (1985). These values lead liberal
individualists to seek limitations on state power. One principal theoretical means to this
end is to employ the natural rights idea first elaborated in the seventeenth century. See
Horwitz, Public/Private, supra note 121, at 1423.
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by providing rights to protect private matters.
Corporate doctrine took on a private cast by the turn of the
century. This shift brought the practical effect of endowing corporate managers with insulation from government oversight under the
business judgment principle. Anti-managerialists challenged this
protected status on public-private grounds. The commentary began
with Berle and Means and intensified after the Second World
12 9
War.
Post war anti-managerialists argued that management corporations-termed "public corporations"-had a public character that
justifies regulation. The argument appears in both extreme and
moderate versions. In the extreme version corporate law privatized
the firm between the mid-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth
century.' 30 But the received, private picture mistakenly rests on
doctrinally-based conceptions of private property. Shifting eyes
away from doctrine and to a functional view, a public entity appears
along with the power, impact, and control of corporations. Corporations, in substance, amount to "private governments."' 3 ' Furthermore, proof of public character illustrates the "need" for
accountability. Democratic models from political science provide
bases for reform.' 3 2 This presentation acknowledges concession
theory but relegates it to a role subordinate to corporate "publicness"; it figures in only as a favorable historical antecedent. 3 3 More
129 The "public" theme figured into doctrinal fairness jurisprudence as well as policy debates. See Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/PrivateDistinctions
Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1449, 1480 (1982). A public model of corporations
implies strict scrutiny of the behavior of corporate managers in matters affecting the
interests of investors. Corporate doctrine, however, follows the trust model in name
only. In practice, it leaves substantial room for self-interested conduct by corporate
managers.
130
See Dahl, Governing the Giant Corporation, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 12 (R.
Nader & M. Green eds. 1972).
131
See R. NADER, J. SELIGMAN& M. GREEN, supra note 9, at 1, 7; Dahl, supra note 130,
at 2; Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 155, 176 (1957); Latham, supra note 24, at 220.
Observers sympathetic with the new economic theory also confirm that the "public
or private" question is the leading contemporary corporate law issue. See Winter, The
Development of the Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 524, 525-26 (1984).
132 Since they perceived the firm as public and political, they applied current political theories respecting government to the firm. The analytical framework of interest
group pluralism prevalent during the post-war period came to bear on matters of corporate governance policy. Cf Horwitz, Public/Private,supra note 121, at 1427.
133 The anti-managerialists supported their public and political assertions with a historical story:
In the beginning, in the early nineteenth century, corporate formation was a matter
of special chartering by state legislatures. In those days, legal doctrine treated corporate
power legally as a concession of sovereignty. Thus, before 1830 corporations were
"chips off the block of sovereignty," R. NADERJ. SELIGMAN & M. GREEN, supra note 9, at

33-37, and bodies created to "obtain public ends." Id. at 62-63; see also Latham, supra
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moderate commentators restructure the argument. 134 Corporations
remain on the private side of the line, but represent private law creatures in which the public has an interest arising from functional considerations. But these functional considerations have a politically
neutral cast, such as protecting reasonable expectations and maximizing efficiency. 135 When the functional considerations combine
so as to legitimate government intervention in the case of "public"
corporations, the certificate of incorporation has "constitutional" as
well as "contractual" implications.1 3 6 Again concession theory
13 7
figures in only as an historical phenomenon.
2.

Sovereign Coercion Theory

Broader theories of sovereign involvement in private contract
inform the anti-managerial arguments. These theories began with
legal realists like Morris Cohen 138 and Robert Hale, 139 and survive
14 1
in the post-realist writings of H.L.A. Hart 140 and Hans Kelsen.
These theories conjoin the government and the contract through
sovereign enforcement of private contracts. The private market
represents an artifact of "public violence."' 142 Contractual arrangements always entail sovereign commands and, therefore, are never
fully private. Stating the point more expansively, the necessity of
public enforcement makes contract a "delegation" of "coercive
note 24, at 222-23. Then, during the course of the nineteenth century, special chartering waned and disappeared as a means to the end of promoting equal access to the
corporate form. Unfortunately, dark forces took control around the turn of the century.

States ceded legal control to management groups in exchange for tax dollars. These
bad faith transactions permitted corporations to escape their historical duty to serve
public ends, even as corporations continued to derive their constituent and legitimating
power from the state and to share its sovereignty. See Latham, supra, at 223; see generally
Jacobson, supra note 117.
134 The anti-managerialists also differed on matters of detail. They differed on the
selection of the interest groups entitled to participate in corporate governance. Technical questions also came up about means of achieving representation. They held different opinions about the degree of control on management discretion actually exercized
by market forces and other institutional constraints, and made accordingly different recommendations of necessary degrees of legal control of management. See A. BERLE, supra
note 20, at 58-60.
135 See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 588.
136
Ratner, Coiporationsand the Constitution, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 21, 27 (1980-81); see
also M. EISENBERG, supra note 82, at 1.

137

Ratner, supra note 136, at 19-20; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 588.
See M. COHEN, PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASES OF CONTRACT LAW AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER 41, 69, 102 (1938).
139 See Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470 (1923).
140
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961).
138

141

H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW §§ 36-40 (1967).

142

See Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L.

REV. 1349, 1352 (1982) (reviewing Hale, supra note 139).
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power" to individuals. 43 Contracting becomes "legislation" 144 -a
public event. As the public coloration of the particular contract becomes more intense, the argument that the delegated coercive
power should be publicly accountable becomes more persuasive.145
The management corporation represents, of course, the most colorably public of all private contracts.
Extreme statements of this theory of sovereignty in contract resemble concession theory by asserting that the sovereign delegates
in theory and the delegation justifies sovereign intervention in business relationships in practice. But concession theory and sovereign
coercion theory are materially different. Concession theory employs
a crude and absolute concept of delegation. The delegation transforms the business arrangement; the transformed business owes all
of its many essential parts to the sovereign. Sovereign coercion theory recognizes a more complex reality and settles for considerably
less sovereign involvement. Although every contractual relationship
threatens sovereign coercion, this fact results only in a diminution
of the private arrangement's claim to voluntariness. It denies
neither freedom of contract nor the obviously individual aspects of
contractual arrangements categorically.
Sovereign coercion theory pleases political moderates by allowing them to identify situations of meaningful voluntariness requiring no reform. Within the theory, they need only look at the
contractual relationship in practice and ascertain whether the actors
involved believe it to be voluntary and remain largely unconscious
of or unconcerned with the sovereign coercion entailed. Actors in
many situations partake of this largely unalienated consciousness.
Concession theory, once applied to a contractual relationship, does
not anticipate these practical moments of free contract. This results
in both its general implausibility and its attractiveness to enthusiasts
of the new economic theory looking for easy anti-statist theoretical
victories. The sovereign coercion assertion, in contrast, does not
admit of flat refutation. The state's presence is undeniable.
C.

The Firm According to New Economic Theorists: The
Private Product of Consenting Actors
1. The Private Firm

The new economic theory brings unmitigated liberal individualism back to corporate legal theory. The nexus of contracts assertion
143
M. COHEN, supra note 138, at 41, 69, 102; see Horwitz, Public/Private,supra note
121, at 1426.
144 Jacobson, supra note 117, at 605-06.
145
Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1351-52.
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simultaneously reinforces the public-private distinction and pulls
the corporation to the private side. It counters decades of antimanagerialist writing, inviting us to wring the tort out of our concept of corporate law and to reconstruct the concept on a consensual basis.
Liberal individualism appears boldly in the neoclassicists' picture of the firm. Their contentless nexus of contracts formed by
rational economic actors approximates Hayek's "spontaneous order."' 14 6 In Hayek's political vision, individuals pursuing their own
ends effect successful social orders. Institutions function without
deliberate design by higher powers and sovereigns need not impose
directives on individuals. The neoclassicists bring this vision of social order to the management corporation, carrying the concept
even further than Hayek did.' 4 7 Their contractual firm is spontaneous, arising from the contracts of free economic actors rather than
through the planning of hierarchically placed superiors. The actors
pursue their own interests within each discrete contractual arrangement. Yet a larger, integrally functioning mechanism emerges from
the atomistic conduct. The necessary cohesion springs from the resourcefulness and evaluative capacity of the constantly contracting
participants. 4 8 No higher authority or intelligence establishes a
"purpose" or imposes duties entailing subordination of individual
purposes.
The notion of spontaneous order is new to the theory of the
firm. More traditional firm contractualism perceives the parties as
the source of energy, but also recognizes the constitutive function of
planning. For example, the institutional new economic theorists
recognize structure, hierarchy, and planning but they erect it on a
contractual constitution. 49 Since the structures are means to
achieve cost reduction, the state has no formative role to play; it
possesses no more expertise at cost reduction than the contracting
parties themselves. 150 Thus the firm is "private."
2.

The Actors' Consent

The new economic theory implicitly rebuts sovereign coercion
theory. Sovereign enforcement manifestly exists, but sovereign enSee 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 2, 11, 289
146
(1973). To Hayek, the mere existence of an institution provides evidence that it was
created to achieve human purposes.
147 Hayek views corporations as "organizations"-institutions distinct from spontaneous orders. See id.
148 See Meckling, supra note 38, at 550 (contrasting the vision of man as a rational
economic actor with that of economists who advocate planning).
149 See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
150 See Williamson, supra note 68, at 361.
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forcement occurs legitimately only when people want enforcement. 15 ' So long as the contracting parties consent, sovereign
enforcement of contracts presents no theoretical problem. The economic actors of the new economic theory-both the neoclassical
and the institutional casts-make all requisite consents.
Professor Anthony Kronman, writing in the institutionalist
vein,' 5 2 advances the consent point several steps further and
equates all techniques of contract enforcement, private and sovereign. They are similar in kind because the process of cost reduction
generates them all. Since state mechanisms provide the lowest cost
enforcement mechanisms in many situations, state intervention is
justifiable. If the state did not exist, contracting parties presumably
would invent it in their effort to reduce lower costs. 15 3 This view of
the state as a cost reducing agency equates the firm and the state,
according them a common constitutional essence. The legitimacy of
both rests on contract; the "governed" want more wealth, and their
rationality allows the assumption of their consent to cost reductive
institutions.
Oddly, this institutionalist cost-reductive conception of the
state resembles the concession theory of centuries ago. Under both,
no fundamental differences exist between the nature of the legitimate corporation and of the legitimate state. The institutionalist
theory differs, of course, in locating the analysis in private rather
than public quarters, and in contract rather than positive law.
3.

Summary

Institutionalists and neoclassicists employ different political
strategies to a similar end. Neoclassicists refashion the firm in bold
outlines to anchor its immovable location on the private side of the
public-private divide. In so doing they reconstruct the firm to eliminate the phenomena on which anti-managerialists rely in calling the
firm public. The institutionalists admit the existence of many "public" phenomena. They advance the case for privatization, however,
by refashioning the public-private divide. Less formalist than the
neoclassicists, they present a gray area of mixed elements, reconstructing our thinking so as to highlight the contractual and the private in what otherwise appears public. Carried to its ultimate
conclusion, their perspective makes cost-reductive contractualism
the essence of all sovereign and individual interaction respecting
151 SeeJacobson, supra note 117, at 612-13 (describing sovereignty as merely a "pretext to suppress and control the energy of persons").
152 See Kronman, supra note 103, at 28.
153

Id.
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business relationships. 154
D.

Political Theories of the Firm and Corporate Doctrine
1. Public and Private Conjoined

Theories that separate the world into public and private elements offer two plausible and instructive pictures. One sees the
world as a complex of contracts; the other sees it as delegated sovereign authority. Neither depiction, however, is wholly accurate. Public and private elements simultaneously pervade the lives of most
persons and institutions. Freedom of contract is freedom to ask the
sovereign to confer power constraining your freedom on another
party. At the same time, contract cannot exist where sovereign control is complete; it requires some minimum of individual autonomy.'

55

In theory, market and political environments may be

distinguished, , 56 but in practice they intermix. Just as one may view
markets as erections upon sovereign coercive power, so one may
view government bureaucracies as operating on contractual
norms. 15 7 An individualist observer may see recent history in terms
of government imposing public duties on private parties. 158 At the
same time, a collectivist may see the same history as a fall from the
belief in a distinctively public realm standing above private self in60
terest. 15 9 Yet both make legitimate observations.'
154
This cost-reductive contractualism is utilitarian in nature. Under it, wealth creation is consonant with individual freedom because people want it and institutions are
justified to the extent that they increase wealth. But one wonders how institutionalists
would respond to a real world case in which people did not wish to take advantage of a
cost-reductive institution. Perhaps they believe that such cases do not exist and that
human freedom and cost reduction are entirely harmonious in practice.
The contractualism of the neoclassicists has a more deontological character. They
most likely believe human freedom to be worth protecting for its own sake. Of course
they also believe that rational economic actors reach efficient results if left alone. But
one wonders which they would choose in cases where wealth is better produced by collective endeavor than by self-interested pursuit of individual ends. One supects that
they would escape this deontological-utilitarian tension by deconstructing the proferred
collective endeavor and reconstructing it in terms of individual pursuits.
155 See Macneil, supra note 89, at 368-69.

156

See Stone, supra note 129, at 1445-56.

157

Macneil identifies contractual relationships within as well as outside of govern-

ment. See, e.g., Macneil, Bureaucracy,Liberalism and Community-American Style, 79 Nw. U.L.

REv. 900, 934-39 (1984-85) (describing bureaucracies as relational communities).
158
See 1 F.HAYEK, supra note 146, at 132.
159
See Horwitz, Public/Private,supra note 121, at 1427. Horwitz sees interest-group
pluralism as a privitization of public matters.
160
Viewed from a metapolitical level, interest group pluralists arguing that management corporations are public institutions occupy substantial common ground with individualists arguing that they are private institutions. Both sides hold a suspicion of
organicist thinking-a point of view under which the interests of collectivities, absolutely
conceived, may be deemed paramount. Romano, supra note 110, at 935 (organicist
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Corporate doctrine instantiates this complex reality. Concession theory, strongly asserted, as a result never achieved quiet enjoyment as determinative doctrine. Instead, corporate doctrine
recognized that autonomous individuals generate the determinative
energies in business arrangements and reach for the state's aid only
to make their arrangements stick. 16 1 Corporate doctrine, however,
has never looked solely to contract either to constitute or to explain
business organizations. Again practice constrains the theory; state
involvement remain visible to all.
Theoretical tugs of war across the public-private dividing line
have limited value. At some point, political discussions based on
characterizations of the corporation derived ex ante from economic
or political theories retain only a tenuous bearing on the corporation as a practical legal institution. Positive learning about corporations ceases and instruction elucidates only the observers' political
values and aspirations. Corporate legal discussion should apply theories of public and private gently, to highlight matters of degree.
The practical tie can gain strength by ex post inspection of corporate
doctrine for its ontological and political contents.
2.

Corporate Doctrine as Corporate Political Theory

Corporate doctrine accommodates both individual and sovereign roles of firms with much less apparent strain than the theoretical discourse suggests. The coexistence of public and private
elements in the doctrine teaches a lesson about the political values
operating in corporate regulation. For example, the concession notion survives in corporate doctrine' 62 even though it disappeared
from theory. Corporations still are created only upon application to
states. This formalism persists even though no one seriously accepts the notion that the state "breathes life" into the corporation
and even though corporate lawyers assume that corporations are reifications stemming from the shared consciousness of individuals.
No commentary of the new economic theory, however, challenges this last incident of concession theory in corporate doctrine.
The commentators dismiss corporate creation through state filing as
thinking has attracted few adherents in American corporate governance literature).
Both sides seek a politics structured around respect for the interests of smaller social
units-the interest group in one case, and the individual in the other. Both sides are
nonhierarchically disposed, albeit in different degrees. See Frug, supra note 23, at 135659, 1374. Both sides pursue a vision of freedom that counsels restraint of the power of
bureaucracies.
161 See generally Jacobson, supra note 117.
162 See I H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW 4, 21 (1958) (example of post-war
doctrinal conceptions).
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ministerial and de minimis. t6 3 In the alternative, they explain filing
and other mandatory provisions of state corporation law as cost saving ways of giving economic actors what they want. 164 Such explanations carry weight, of course, but they incompletely depict
corporate doctrine's political operations.
The shortcomings of cost reduction as an explanation for state
creation of corporations become apparent upon comparing the different formalities attending the contractual creation of substantively
similar business arrangements. Complex joint ventures and other
organizations arise without state filing as do large issues of long
term debt securities. Debt securities are long-term corporate investment arrangements between management groups and outsiders.
The same actors, when dealing in equity securities, avail themselves
of the positive law terms which the new economic theorists characterize as "off the rack" contract terms. The debt securities carry
contractually-imposed governance structures dealing with the same
subject matter as state corporate law.' 6 5 But debt governance structures emerge without ex ante state participation.
An act of consent may be implied to explain the state's absence
from the creation of "off the rack" terms respecting debt securities-the parties have decided to keep the state out. Their own standardized contracts keep the cost of bond contract terms down, so
the state is unnecessary. 6 6 It follows that if the parties keep governance costs down by writing their own debt contracts, corporate law
should evolve similarly to treat the creation of relationships between
equity holders and corporate entities. The technical changes are accomplished easily; upon this change in the law, any skilled corporate
law technician could devise a contractual governance system for a
given corporation. Investors would contract with managers or contract inter se to form corporations under standard contracts containing provisions much like present state corporation laws, or
163

See Hessen, supra note 108, at 1336-38.

See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 5, at 401 (voting rules of state
corporate law explained as means of economizing on costs of contracting); Easterbrook
164

& Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,supra note 5, at 702 (state corporate law fiduciary

duties as cost-saving approximations of what the parties would bargain for themselves).
165
Among other things, trust indentures have procedural provisions governing
securityholder voting; they state groundrules for litigation by securityholders; they establish securityholder rights to inspect books and records; they forbid managerial selfdealing; and they restrict management discretion. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS 1965, MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS ALL REGISTERED
ISSUES, 1967 AND CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE PROVISIONS (1971); Model Simplied Indenture, 38

Bus. LAw. 741 (1983).
166 See Bratton, The Economics andJurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds, 1984 WIS. L. REV.

667, 680-88 (discussing the efficiency of the standard form bond contract).
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significantly, such different provisions as the actors deem appropriate. Choice of law clauses would bring the benefits of the law and of
decisionmaking of sympathetic jurisdictions. On this model, corporate contract formation works like other contract formation. It requires no ex ante obeiscence to some sovereign. Concession theory
finally disappears from the law.
Corporations as we know them could be created easily by conventional contract. If the corporation really "is" contract, as the
new economic theory tells us, then the last doctrinal vestiges of state
interference should have withered away by now, along with the superannuated political theories that prompted their invention in the
first place. But the sovereign presence persists. Traces of concession theory survive in the mundane corporate formalities mandated
in law. Whether or not most parties want these formalities in most
situations, they remain as a practical matter, restrictions on freedom of contract. They foreclose organizational and governmental
alternatives ordinarily available to contracting parties, and in a dynamic economic environment ordinarily chosen by them.
This sovereign presence, mediated by corporate lawyers, limits
and conditions the freedom of contract in corporate relationships.
The contracting capacity of corporate actor suffers little impairment
as a practical matter since they can comply with corporate formalities at low cost and since corporate formalities rarely obstruct attainment of significant economic objectives. But the state clearly
reserves the right to rewrite the ground rules and to constrain the
freedom of corporate actors. 6 7 Even as corporate law lets the participants proceed, it in effect cautions them that they may act at will
only if on good behavior. 168 Corporate law facilitates and legitimates private behavior, but with a reservoir of suspicion and a threat
of constraint.
One function of corporate law, then, is symbolic: It reminds
actors that corporate contracting rights have a lessor magnitude
than the contracting rights attending most other business relationships. This function explains and justifies corporate law's survival as
a positive law phenomenon in a world where other complex business relationships proceed under the private, general law of
contracts. 169
167
This appears to be the message of our greatest corporate law case, Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), with its simultaneous provision
for a contractual corporation and the constitutional reservation of sovereign right to
change the terms governing the corporate contract.
168
The enduring possibility of state dissolution by means of a quo warranto proceeding makes this threat explicit. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124(3) (1983).
169
Corporate law has more than one function, of course. It also influences the contracting process by stating the terms that govern absent contrary agreement. Since con-
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Even as corporate law imposes a positive law framework, however, it tends to leave corporate actors self-regulated. Corporate
law decisionmakers accept the doctrine's mixed basis and hesitate to
question the balance it strikes between individual, contractual initiative, and positive law restraint. Indeed, the theory of the firm rarely
influences corporate law decisionmaking, even though such decisionmaking routinely formulates corporate law in terms of both corporate entities and separate relationships, and in terms of both
"public" corporations and "private" contract rights. Conveniently,
the mixed doctrine provides ad hoc theoretical justification for a
range of dispositions, from sovereign intervention to individual selfresponsibility. The doctrinal discourse focuses on practical questions and answers, considered situationally. The sudden assertion
of an absolute proposition that the corporation is contract will not
disturb this pattern, even though it may influence the balance struck
in particular situations.
IV
THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS, CONTRACT THEORY AND THE

CORPORATE FIRM

Lawyers and economists employ different, although related, notions of contract. The lawyer understands contract as a business or
commercial exchange: Classical contract doctrine and the lawyer's
mental images of the documentation of particular transactions circumscribe this conception. The economist thinks more broadly in
terms of voluntary exchanges and other relations among free
agents. For the economist, any particular transaction will be a theoretical construct, devised outside history through the manipulation
of hypothetical economic actors.
Legal scholars draw on both conceptions of contract and on
others besides. They associate with the concept of contract a range
of different assertions, both positive and normative, from theory
and from practice, and perhaps varying the contents of the assertions in different contexts. Through Macneil's capacious relational
theory academic contract now extends from the narrow confines of
classical contract doctrine to accommodate virtually all relationships
among the actors in a modern, heavily bureaucratized, and exhaus70
tively governed society.'
This multiplicity of contract concepts has made difficult the reception of the nexus of contracts corporation into legal theory.
trary agreement is reached only at additional cost, the law inevitably bears on the
contract terms.
170
See I. MACNEIL, supra note 87; Macneil, supra note 89; Macneil, supra note 157;
Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483.
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When the new economic theory first appeared, most corporate legal
academics shared the legal practitioner's understanding of contract.
Corporate scholarship drew doctrinal distinctions between corporate and contract law, 17 1 displaying little consciousness of the fundamental place contract, more broadly conceived, always held in
corporate legal theory. The nexus of contracts assertion introduced
a different, very particular concept of contract. Prior corporate
literature offered no basis for informed and critical evaluation of
this unfamiliar economic concept of contract. Yet no commentary
identifying this concept's distinguishing characteristics accompanied
its introduction. Interdisciplinary exercises, mismanaged in this
way, carry a danger of communicative failure and, worse, an opportunity for strategic obfuscation of meaning. Not surprisingly, confusion resulted.
The nexus of contracts assertion entered popular corporate law
discourse with a somewhat mystifying aspect. It made sense. Its unspoken individualist underpinnings resonated and its advocates employed analytical tools of an undoubtedly contractual character. But
their analyses, while called "contractual," did not resemble corporate law applications of the principles of the latest contracts Restatement. 172 Sometimes, these applications of "contract" to corporate
law questions brought results flowing from neither prevailing cor73
porate doctrine nor prevailing contract doctrine.1
Evaluating the new economic theory as a corporate law tool requires an initial understanding of the meaning of the "contract" in
the "nexus of contracts." This part of this article seeks to provide
the necessary explication. Its first subpart sets out the range of approaches to contract that appear in contemporary legal theory. It
identifies the elements that distinguish these theories-the stress of
171
See Bratton, supra note 166, at 730-35 (black letter law distinguishing corporate
duties from contract duties); M. EISENBERG, supra note 82, at 9-10; 1 F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.05 (1987) (contrasting corporate law
model with close corporation arrangements based on bargains among the parties).
172
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
Recent work begins to clear up this confusion by selectively drawing on contract
doctrine instead of economic theory in elaborating contractual modifications of corporate law. Coffee offers a "web of contracts" counter, inspired by the neoclassical contract doctrine of Corbin and the Restatement (Second). See Coffee, supra note 6, at 92425; Coffee, The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and
Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435; see generally Masten, supra note 94.
Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, for example, a rule of managerial passivity in
173
the face of a take-over bid. Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement
in Respondingto a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174-82 (1981); see also Scott, supra
note 5, at 935-37 (suggesting abolition of the corporate law duty of care on the ground
that market monitoring mechanisms are adequate); Wolfson, supra note 5, at 975-78,
980-82 (suggesting fiduciary scrutiny of management salaries and the corporate opportunity doctrine are unnecessary).
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discrete and relational contracts, the stress of different individual
and community values, and the use of differently conceived contracting actors. It draws on these elements of contract theory to describe the corporation and corporate doctrine. It presents the
corporation as a complex contract, simultaneously containing discrete and relational elements, and presents corporate doctrine as a
mediating device that permits the legal treatment of corporate situations to vary according to varying contract particulars.
The succeeding subparts examine the concepts of power and
consent operative in the nexus of contracts concept. This discussion asserts that the new theory's primary contribution is the interpretation of corporate relationships in terms of voluntary
participation. It contrasts the different assumptions underlying the
hierarchical, managerialist picture and it concludes that, while the
new theory isolates consensual and transactional elements in corporate relations, and while the managerialist picture unduly minimizes
these elements, the new theory ultimately asks far too much of the
concept of consent. In reaching this conclusion, the discussion isolates the narrow base of liberal and utilitarian values that inform the
new economic theory and draws on twentieth century contract theory for its critique of consent as a basis for justifying enforcement of
contracts.
A.

Theories of Contract-Discrete and Relational
1. The Individual versus the Contract

Theories of contract embody concepts of human relations. In
part, these concepts are the positive results of observation of the
behavior patterns of real world contracting actors. But the concepts
also contain values. Sometimes the values originate with real world
contracting actors, sometimes they originate with the theorist, and
sometimes they originate with some wider community. When they
originate with the theorist or the community, the values will likely
manifest themselves as norms.
Different theories of contract incorporate different visions of
the contracting actor. Where the theory casts neoclassical rational
economic actors in all the roles, the resulting contracts will be "discrete" 174 or "purposive."1 75 These ideal contracts resemble the abstract market transactions of the real world. They are complete,
concrete, and delimited and they "presentiate"' 17 6 and quantify all
174

1.

175

M.

A.

MACNEIL,

supra note 87, at 10-11.
668-81 (G. Roth & C. Wittlich eds. 1968); see

WEBER, ECONOMY AND SocIETY

KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 101 (1983).
1. MACNEIL, supra note 87, at 59-60.

176
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foreseeable matters respecting the relationship. The actors separate
their identities from the contract. Since the actors enter completely
planned relationships, they in theory bind themselves to the contract and restrict their future choices without impairing their freedom as individuals.' 77 Legal scholarship that draws on the
neoclassical microeconomic model applies the discrete mode to
business relationships. Classical contract doctrine tends to do so as
well.
Other theories of contract envision differently constituted actors with cognitive and analytical failings. These actors sometimes
fail to presentiate and quantify entire relationships, particularly
when relationships endure for long periods of time and depend on
contingent events. The theories draw on a wide range of values to
formulate principles that explain, facilitate, and justify the survival
of these relationships in the face of these difficulties. The actors'
initial acts of consent provide a starting point, but time and events
sometimes distance the participants from their initial consents. As
the scope and effective range of the actors' initial consent narrows
with respect to the developing and changing relationship, other values must provide sustenance. The relationship continues on a foundation of reciprocal exchange, but the actors feel bound less by their
past actions than by their present state of mutual dependency. Such
mutually dependent actors look to values of relational preservation,
solidarity, and flexibility to integrate themselves and their individual
interests with the terms of the ongoing relationship.
Recognizing these relational elements in contracts raises a
political question whether the relationship, and values internal to it,
may be privileged over the independence of the individual participants. Assuming individualist values of any intensity, sovereign intervention on behalf of the relationship poses dangers. The
literature contains various responses to the problem. Some theories
strain to leave the individual dominant and fully respected and, at
the same time, recognize both relational contingency and sovereign
intervention. They usually interpret creatively the individual's act of
consent.as the means to this end. The consenting individual in
some measure creates and in some measure controls; thereby he
bears responsibility for the later dominant relationship. 78 The institutional variant of the new economic theory represents one ver177
This description encapsulates Macneil's discussions. See id. at 59-64; Macneil,
supra note 89, at 360-61.
178
Professor Charles Fried interprets the promise expansively. The promise invokes a convention giving another moral ground on which to expect performance. Thus
the relationship is based on trust. When the parties' explicit arrangements fail to provide determining rules for the relationship,judges intervene to protect the parties' trusting expectations. Since the contracting actors seek fairness and consent to a fair regime,
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sion of this approach. 179
Under other theories, the relationship may dominate the individual and ex ante individual consent need not be drawn on for legitimation. These "communitarian" theories recognize independent
value in symbiotic relationships between individuals and between
groups and individuals. 8 0 Most of these theorists refrain from embodying these values in norms manifested in positive law. 18 ' While
not individualists, they share the American aversion to the constraints on freedom imposed within the modem bureaucratic state.
2.

Contract Theory and the Corporate Firm

The corporate firm raises the same theoretical choices between
the individual and the relationship that other contracts raisechoices between discrete and relational conceptions and between individual and community values. Corporate doctrine, in effect, takes
positions on these choices. It suggests the possibility that individual
interests may be legitimately subordinated to those of a larger firm
community and it imposes this treatment as a matter of positive law.
Despite this recognition of relational bonds, however, corporate
doctrine does not privilege the group over the individual unequivocally. The corporate community is voluntary, and its common goals
tend to play limited roles in the lives of its members. The same
individualist values supporting the discrete vision of contract inevitably influence corporate relationships, creating tension between
these values and utilitarian goals of the group and related group
values. Corporate doctrine eases this tension. It mediates disputes
between the interests of corporate participants and those of the
group. It draws both on values of discrete contract and on relational values of mutual support. It affords a basis on which group
interests may dominate individual interests legitimately on a fact
specific basis. The legal model of the discrete contract influences
corporate doctrine but does not dominate it.
Relational contract theory explains the subordinated position
later sovereign intervention and direction does not violate their individual autonomy.
See C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 14-17, 83 (1983).
179
See supra text accompanying notes 59-86.
180 See I. MACNEIL, supra note 87; Feinman, CriticalApproaches to Contract Law, 30
UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contractand Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Conipulsoiy Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV.
563 (1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Paternalismn];Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).

181 Macneil accomplishes this by limiting his positive theorizing to values while simultaneously treating the sovereign with critical scrutiny. Critical legal studies adherents draw on the utopian tradition of the Frankfurt School instead.
At least one theorist looks to sovereign imposition of communitarian values. See
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies M1ovement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
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of discrete contract in corporate legal doctrine. The discrete contract, with its expectations of individual advantage secured by the
threat of state enforcement, fails to provide a sufficiently durable
foundation for cooperative action. Planning depends on mutual
trust, and the law facilitates mutual trust through state created obligations. 8 2 In the corporate law context, the fiduciary conception
usually plays this role.
The new economic theory proposes that we reconceive the firm
on a less relational basis than that previously established and manifested in corporate doctrine. The neoclassical variant proposes the
more substantial departure. As we have seen, its nexus of contracts
consists of discrete contracts among rational economic actors, and
the firm springs up as a spontaneous productive order. This conception unequivocally favors individual values. Communitarian
norms disappear since they serve neither as instruments for productivity nor as appropriate ethical responses in the market-like world
envisioned.
The institutional variant offers a vision of the firm more closely
related to traditional corporate doctrine. When confronted with the
problem of justifying a complex relationship, however, the institutionalists make the common move among individualist theories of
contract. They establish individual dominance by elaborating a
structure of consensual participation.
Both variants conflict with the more relational assumptions conventionally held by corporate lawyers. The following discussion addresses these conflicts. It first contrasts the concepts of power
operative in the new theory with those operative in corporate doctrine. It then considers concepts of consent.
B.

Power
1. The ManagerialistHierarchy

The managerialist approach views the firm as hierarchical-a
structure of power relationships 8 3 whose purpose is to organize
productive behavior. 8 4 The power is exercised unilaterally. That
is, the superior in the hierarchy has the authority to direct the
subordinate's actions or otherwise subject the subordinate to partic85
ular effects without the subordinate's consent.
182
Gordon, Macaul,, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 569-70 (describing Macauley and Macneil's relational/discrete
contract distinction in the corporate setting).
183
C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 21 (1977).
184
Many of course, recognize subsidiary purposes, among them the maximization of
returns to the stockholders and the enrichment and empowerment of the managers.
185
Macneil, supra note 11, at 1049.
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Power relations based on discrete contracts and other marketbased relationships have a very different structure. In the unrelated,
atomistic situations of the market, economic actors also seek to organize productive behavior. But actors in the market only have the
power to abstain from conferring benefits on one another. By effecting exchanges, they forego continued exercise of this power. In
other words, instead of creating unilaterally held powers, discrete
86
contracts vitiate unilaterally held powers through consent.'
The firm, viewed as an hierarchical structure of unilateral power
relationships, stands apart from the market as an entity. The firm
experiences market forces because it buys or hires inputs on the
market and sells its output on the market. But internally, the firm
resembles a little government. 8 7 This conception pervades modern
legal and economic commentary on the firm appearing in works of
those with widely divergent political dispositions.'18 Even Hayek,
who advances the spontaneous order as a political and social ideal,
places the modern corporation in the different category of organizations whose governing principles do not mix freely with those of
markets. 18 9
Carried over to the scrutiny of management corporations, these
assumptions about firm organization raise the basic managerialist
point: Corporate organization generates power and management is
strategically situated to possess this power. Many dispute the propriety of this corporate power as wielded by management. On one
side stands familiar anti-managerial discourse, with its special emphasis on management's power to effect results external to the corporation.19 0 This discourse fits into broader critiques of
bureaucratic organizations, both corporate and governmental, and
of the power they wield.' 9 1 At the other end of the range stand ob186
187
188

Id. at 1036, 1050.
C. LINDBLOM, supra note 183, at 36-38.
Compare id. at at 21-22, 33-38, 45-47, with 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 30, at 25-26

(both describe and distinguish market-based and hierarchical organizations from quite
different political points of view). See I. MACNEIL, supra note 87, at 7-8 (describing bureaucratic economic organizations and showing their exercise of unilateral power); Macneil, supra note 157, at 906 (individuals and organizations are ultimately separate;
internal boundaries separate the goals of organizations from the goals of individual
participants).
189
See 1 F. HAYEK, supra note 146, at 47-51; 3 F. HAYEK, supra note 101, at 80-88.
According to Hayek, organizations are constitituted of rules and commands. The rules
come from the designing mind of the organizer and set forth organizational structures.
They make it possible to make use of knowledge which no one individual possesses as a
whole. Commands prevail over rules.
Hayek's spontaneous orders exist subject to conventional rules without the necessity of commands. 1 F. HAYEK, supra note 146, at 47-51.
190
191

See generally supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
See Macneil, supra note 157; Frug, supra note 23.
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servers like Hayek. He recognizes that organizational structures
produce dangerous powers but finds corporations to be benign organizations as a practical matter and remains unconcerned with
1 92
their internal and external activities.
Somewhere in the middle stands the moderate anti-managerialism of many post-war corporate legal academics. Berle elaborated
the conventional wisdom in the mid-1950s. Management wields
power in several arenas: It directs the activities of subordinates; it
determines the existence and course of corporate business operations; it determines the markets the corporation supplies; it initiates
technical developments; it directs the direction and extent of capital
expansion; and, within limits, it participates in the formulation of
public opinion.19 3 Berle argued that market forces and public opinion in a democratic state substantially constrain this power. Under
this widely-held view, corporate law directed its policy-making energies to creating moderately intensified fiduciary principles and mar194
ket disclosure regulations.
Two new forces, one theoretical and the other practical, disturb
this Berlian picture of corporate power relationships. The theoretical challenge comes from the new economic theory. The practical
challenge comes from the disruptive effects of the market for corpo95
rate control. The following discussion considers only the former.1
2.

The Voluntary Corporation of the New Economic Theory

Consider again the unilateral power relationship that makes an
organization hierarchical: A superior tells a subordinate what to do.
To the extent that subordinate obeys involuntarily, the relationship
impairs his freedom and the superior coerces. Anti-managerial descriptions of the corporation implicitly or explicitly assert that those
empowered in the hierarchy coerce others. The new economic theorists differ by emphasizing the voluntary nature of corporate
participation.
This is a crucial move: Once corporate relationships are conceived as fully voluntary, a different picture of the corporate hierarchy emerges. Hierarchical power impairs no freedom, even though
the superior tells the subordinate what to do. As consent becomes
192

Hayek would restrain monopolies. Otherwise corporate power does not worry

him. Organizations, he says, wield little power over "those who join to further their own
benefit." 3 F. HAYEK, supra note 101, at 80-89.
193
See A. BERLE, supra note 20, at 32-34.
194 The most recent, thorough-going restatement of this view comes from outside
of the legal academy. See E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981).
For a condensation, see Herman, The Limits of the Market as a Discipline in CorporateGovernance, 9 DEL.J. CORP. L. 530, 533-34 (1984).
195 For consideration of the latter see Bratton, supra note 3, at 1517-26.
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the relationship's core, the model of discrete contract looks more
and more appropriate. Fully voluntary participation negates the
existence of the superior's unilateral power and, in turn, allows reconstruction of a classic arm's length exchange, but in an apparently
hierarchical context.
The seminal articles in the new theoretical canon made this
move to voluntariness. The subsequent literature adds little to this
basic theoretical paradigm, even as it applies the paradigm more
elaborately. Coase' 96 first looked inside the firm and asked why the
owner of an input would sacrifice his property rights in it to be told
what to do by the owner of firm. He answers, of course, that the
owner of the input gets value by reducing transaction costs.
Although they could eliminate the firm and could price and sell all
the factors of production separately, information costs would make
the determination of price too expensive. But Coase posited more
than an explanation of the firm's existence in terms of transaction
cost reduction. He simultaneously introduced a transactional conception of participation in the firm in which the surrendering input
holder strikes a deal. Hierarchical power springs from and coexists
with the participant's choice.
Alchian and Demsetz, the first to advance the neoclassical variant, succeeded to these points. 9 7 They constructed a firm not only
transactional, but consisting of discrete contracts. The firm, they
asserted, lacks power to settle issues by fiat or by disciplinary action
that is superior to that of a conventional market. As they purged
conventionally conceived power relationships from the firm, they
also pushed out the conventional morality that restrains the powerful. Corporate actors, they said, should restrict their conduct toward others to what it would be if they fully bore the full costs of
that conduct. 198 One might read this and similarly spirited rhetoric,19 9 to assert the nonexistence of the corporate hierarchy. Happily, Alchian and Demsetz did not deny theoretical existence to this
most familiar real world phenomenon.2 0 0 Their "joint team produc196 Coase, supra note 39, at 390-91.
It is generally accepted that people create firm hierarchies and subject themselves to
their governance in order to create wealth. Disputes arise as to the particular wealthcreating effect possessed by firm organization. Coase's emphasis on transaction costs is
one of a number of suggestions. The division of labor, the coordination of production,
and the allocation of investment risk all also have been suggested. See Cheung, supra
note 35, at 3-5.
197 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 777, 794.
198 Id. at 791.
199 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
20t
Indeed, it is likely that a completely unhierarchical firm would fail to hold together. Macneil notes that discreteness and presentiation cannot be made absolute in
relational situations. They can prevail only so long as they avoid conflict with other
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tion" model of the firm centers on a combined owner and residual
claimant which looks like an entity and possesses numerous powers.
Among other things, it observes the input behavior of team members, determines the terms of firm participation contracts, and terminates firm membership. 20 1 "Hierarchical" seems a fair
description of this organizational structure.
Sympathetically read, then, Alchian and Demsetz's work posits
that the hierarchical structures necessary in complex production
processes do not constrain their participants. The firm lacks superior directive power because a participating rational economic actor
who dislikes the terms of the deal offered can walk away and find an
arrangement that better suits him. The hierarchical structure exists,
but on a foundation of perfect consent of participants without
human weaknesses.
All exercises in the new economic theory after Coase and Alchian and Demsetz assume voluntary participation in the firm. The
subsequent models develop an inverted conception of some of the
hierarchical relations described in the managerialist pictures of the
firm. Within the new economic theory, investors in the firm delegate
decisional authority to firm managers. 2 02 The managers, accordingly, lose their status as hierarchical superiors; in the switch, they
become the "agents" of the participants. For example Fama and
Jensen's reconstruction of the relationships between directors, officers and stockholders refrains from employing the image of hierarchy in characterizing corporate organization. 20 3 It conceives of the
organization in power-neutral terms, as a "decision process." The
stockholders, or residual claimants, delegate decisional authority.
Transactional efficiency dictates that decision-making be split into
two functions, decision "control" and decision "management." Interestingly the officers do not possess decision control, as the managerial picture would suggest. Rather, Fama and Jensen echo the
doctrinal model of corporate organization and place decision control in the board of directors, which ratifies and monitors the managers. The subordinated managers do not control; they "manage"
by initiating and implementing decisions. This structure has, of
course, evolved as means toward cost reduction.
The two variants of the new economic theory share Fama and
Jensen's notions that the firm hierarchy arises from delegations of
relational values. In case of conflict, either the other values prevail or the relationship

falls apart. I.

MACNEIL,

supra note 87, at 86.

201

Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 29, at 783-85.

202

See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, CGoporate Control Transactions,supra note 5, at 700;

Romano, supra note 110, at 929.
203

See Fama &Jensen, supra note 10, at 302-03, 307-08, 310-11, 314.
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power by firm participants and that the delegations occur as means
to the end of cost reduction. Both also recognize that the delegations themselves produce their own costs-agency costs. From
here, their differing operative conceptions of the economic actor
cause the neoclassical and institutional variants to diverge. The
fully rational actor tends to accomplish the delegation and the reduction of attendant agency costs by entering into discrete contracts. The bounded rationality and opportunistic tendencies of the
institutionalists' actors, in contrast, lead to contract failures in the
delegation process. A more relational inquiry into the contract of
delegation results, but it remains strictly contained by the assump20
tion of voluntary cost reduction.

4

Professor Anthony Kronman uses cost effective delegation to
explain virtually every value that distinguishes relational contracts
from discrete contracts. 20 5 His explanatory concept is "union," a
device employed by contracting parties to reduce the risks of nonsimultaneous exchange. The concept of union encompasses all arrangements reducing divergences of interest by promoting the spirit
of identity or comradery. Thus, union would seem to explain nearly
all community values. The explanation implies that these values do
not exist simply because people pursue common notions of the
good. Union is a "strategy" that works by eliminating the separateness that makes opposition of interests possible, and thus reduces
costs.
3.

Comments

The new economic theory makes a contribution with these reconstructions of the elements of long-term contractual relationships. It shows the elements of exchange in relations previously
viewed as entirely hierarchical. But it has a concomitant weakness.
The new economic theorists overstate their insight by relentlessly
modelling the relationships in terms of exchange and delegation
only. The neoclassicists achieve this one-sided picture by reshaping
the real world to fit the paradigm. The institutionalists' concept of
"union" reshapes the paradigm of the contract to encompass more
of the real world.
Both exercises are too reductive. Complex corporate organizations involve both a consensual element and the constraints of the
superior's exercise of authority. Looking only at consent in characterizing the relationship unduly restricts our view, causing us to lose
204 Recently, the leading institutionalist suggested that new economic theorists
study hierarchy, remedying previous neglect. See Williamson, supra note 14, at 87-88.
Kronman, supra note 112, at 20-25.
205
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touch with the participants' perceptions. Neither the subordinate
employee who sees himself following directions, nor the investor
who suffers from a manager's questionable application of contributed capital attributes the situation to a choice made from an independent position. Instead, both perceive a position of regrettable
dependence stemming from the received structure of the relationship. Examining the relationship restricted to a notion of a single
deep level of consent ignores whole dimensions of practical reality-economic, psychological and social. 2 0 6 Furthermore, attributing a participant's perceptions of dependency and powerlessness to
false consciousness and weakness accords the participant less than
full respect.
C.

Consent

The nexus of contracts concept places the corporation on a
foundation of contractual consent. Models pursuant to it conjoin
initial consent to contract with corporate governance structures.
The "delegation" of power in management corporations and the
"consent" to contract describe different aspects and different consequences of the same act of participating in the new economic firm.
Thus united, the concepts do not permit easy and complete separation, and the new economic construct deploys them jointly. Without consent, the actor could not plausibly delegate power to other
corporate participants; if the ongoing exercise of authority by those
empowered in the firm stems from delegation, then the subordinates' consent is implicit.
1. Consent, Liberalism and Utilitarianism
Whether denominated "consent" or "delegation," these actions perform the same function as the "manifestation of assent"
under classical contract law. Consent binds the actor to the arrangement and makes enforcement by the sovereign consonant with
human freedom. 20 7 This approach manifests a liberal vision in
206

The discussion in the text draws on Macneil's criticism of Alchian and Demsetz.

See Macneil, supra note 11, at 1053 n.92. Cf M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 2, at 34-35 (discussing the behavior patterns of individuals who attach themselves to organizations).
207
The new theory's consent applies more readily to a pure economic context than
to a corporate law context. Economic methodology permits hypothetical actors to contract against blank slates. Within a model, a single act of assent may bespeak consent to
volumes of restrictions. In the more complex world of intermixed theory and practice of
corporate law, the contracting parties, even if still rational economic actors borrowed
from the neoclassical microeconomic model, contract against a background of positive
law. In the coventional view, the parties submit to the standing legal regime when selecting the corporate form. Law and economics scholarship under the rubric of the new
theory deals with this legal addition to contracting consent by imposing the paradigm on
the law to the extant necessary: Since the firm exists to reduce transaction costs, corpo-
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which individual choice shapes social life.
This intrinsic liberalism makes the new economic theory attractive to the contemporary legal academic audience, the members of
which tend to share the liberal ideal. Prior to the theory's appearance, liberalism hardly ever entered corporate law discourse. The
managerialist picture, with its hierarchies and dependencies, was
heavily socialized. Liberally inclined observers worked under the
paradigm with a sense of unease and hostility, particularly given
constant suggestions of sovereign interference with internal corporate affairs. The new theorists effected a theoretical coup when they
highlighted the market-like characteristics of management corporations: All of a sudden phenomena thought to constrain liberal freedom could be legitimated in liberal terms. The discomfort with the
managerialist paradigm finally received theoretical articulation.
The new theory carries additional attraction to the liberal observer. When forced to decide what is good for others, liberals tend
to be completely comfortable only with the utilitarian norm of
wealth maximization. While recognizing the presence of other
human values, they hesitate to incorporate them in the law for fear
of inhibiting freedom. 20 8 By inviting corporate observers to ignore
these other values, the new economic theory offers an enticing solution to this problem. Liberal observers need not worry about sovereign intervention because actors have already given consent to a
wealth maximizing arrangement. The liberal goal of autonomy and
the utilitarian goal of wealth maximization for once act in
20 9
concord.
2.

The Critique of Contractual Consent

Although the core of consent has made the nexus of contracts
concept attractive, it simultaneously ensures a well-articulated critique by its opponents. Contract law literature contains commentary effectively challenging classical contract's conjunction of
rate law is legitimate only so long as it serves this end. Normally, of course, contracting
parties may be expected to make their own governing rules and should be left alone to

do so. But where the terms are standard, the sovereign may save them costs by providing the terms in advance. Corporate law thus is justifiable so long as it provides the
terms the contracting parties would provide for themselves at greater expense if left to
their own devices. Easterbrook & Fishel, Voting, supra note 5, at 401; Fischel, Corporate
Governance, supra note 5, at 1264. Where inspection of corporate rules pursuant to this
norm shows that it mandates terms the parties would not provide for themselves, then
law and economics pursuant to the new economic theory takes on a reconstructive aspect. See supra the materials cited in note 150; infra materials cited in note 227.
208
Whitford, supra note 11, at 559.
209
See Carlson, Book Review, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1356-61 (1987); cf. Rosenfeld,
supra note 128, at 800 (discussing utilitarians' simultaneous attachment to individualism
and to distributive justice).
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contract, consent, and freedom. The contract critique carries over
to the corporate context. For present purposes, its lessons may be
reduced to two points.
First, contract and freedom conflict intrinsically. Human freedom represents a lack of constraint against the ongoing choice of
courses of action in pursuit of one's own purposes. Contractual
consent to be bound potentially conflicts with this freedom. The
contract, and its sovereign enforcer, constrain future choices. Binding contracts and freedom coexist in complete peace only when the
parties understand all future applications of all contract terms upon
granting consent. Yet even a perfectly understood contract can constrain freedom if a party changes its mind.
Second, the contracting process works imperfectly. Contracts
often fail to detail rules for all contingencies. Sometimes they contain rules, but articulate them unclearly. Parties often fail to understand the contract's future implications. Such imperfections
enhance the potential for conflict between the contract and the parties' freedom of choice. 21 0 The danger is particularly acute under
an objective regime of contract law, such as classical contract. The
power created by the classical contract often preempts the parties'
conscious consent.
Contract theory outside of the classical tradition recognizes
these problems and tends to justify binding a party to a rule not
consciously accepted by invoking some norm in addition to consent.
Different commentators look to different norms. But they tend to
go beyond utility maximization, the supplemental nonliberal norm
chosen by the new economic theorists. Communitarians look to relational values, particularly preservation of the relation and harmonization with society outside the relationship. 2 1' Individualist
commentators have more difficulty. Charles Fried, when forced to
look beyond the contract's literal words, avoids utility and justifies
enforcement on trust and on respect for individual autonomy. In so
doing he envisions a human actor different from the rational economic actor. Reasonableness, he says, may be constrained by fair2 12
ness because reasonable people seek to apply the fairness norm.
210

For further discussion of the distinction between contract and choice see I. MAC-

NEIL, supra note 87, at 49-50; Macneil, supra note 89, at 395. Macneil questions the appli-

cation of classical contract law theories to complex contractual relations. Equating an
act of consent with full planning, he says, is silly.
211
Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra note 157, at 934-39.
212
See C. FRIED, supra note 178, at 16-17, 73, 83. Fried's theory of contract is rooted
in the promise justifying enforcement against a contracting party because the party has
intentionally invoked a convention giving another moral grounds to expect performance. At bottom, individual autonomy and trust, rather than utility, figure as norms.
Utility is served incidentally because contracting parties accomplish things. Id. at 16-17.
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Corporate law fiduciary principles restraining management
power draw on the same relational values that contract theory draws
on to ameliorate the limitations of consent. Appropriately, Victor
Brudney and Robert Clark, in their respective critiques of the new
economic theory, parallel the substance of the contract critique of
consent.2 13 They question the normative force of the act of participation, identify values informing corporate law beyond the norms of
discrete contracting, and envision a more holistically modelled
actor.
More specifically, Brudney and Clark both point out that the
new theorists' corporate contracts lack empirical grounding,2 1 4 so
far reducing reality as to depart from it. Corporate law has significant noncontractual aspects. It operates in an area beyond the conscious agreements that are the subject matter of legal contract.
Shareholders neither select managers nor issue instructions to
them.21 5 Far from seeing themselves as parties to discrete contracts,
shareholders expect managers to work hard for them and do not
consent to management self-dealing. 21 6 The shareholders become
dependent. The relationship is trusting and rests in part on fiduciary underpinnings. 21 7 These points highlight the weaknesses in the
new theorists' agency notion and the delegation of power it
presupposes.
To Brudney and Clark, corporate law contains the lawmakers'
assumptions of the characteristics and preferences of the parties
subject to it, rather than of some actual or implicit act of consent. 218
To the extent corporate law is contractual, it is contractual only metaphorically, like the philosophical social contract.2 1 9 Even the construction of a metaphorical corporate contract is a dubious exercise.
Expost contract construction on a "would have agreed to" basis cannot permit a strictly rational basis. The endless quantity of contingent considerations bearing on corporate contracting precludes
213
Brudney, supra note 8; Clark, supra note 8.
214 Brudney, supra note 8, at 1405-06. Legal scholars applying the new economic
theory like to imply that the economists have discovered consciously determined contractual arrangements. See also Clark, supra note 8, at 62-63.
215 Brudney, supra note 8, at 1421; Clark, supra note 8, at 61-62 (corporate actors
consent to legal roles but do not generally bargain over particular terms); see also Stone,
supra note 129, at 82-83.
216 Brudney, supra note 8, at 1405-06, 1439-40.
217 Clark, supra note 8, at 67.
218 Id. at 67; Brudney, supra note 8, at 1414-15 n.29.
219 This is Professor Clark's point. See Clark, supra note 8, at 61, 62. The "social
contract" characterization comes from Ratner, supra note 136, at 20-21. Ratner draws a
distinction between close corporations and public corporations. Close corporations involve private rights based on consensual agreements. On the other hand, the managers
of public corporations do not act on this sort of contractual basis. The certificate of
incorporation here more closely resembles a national constitution.
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3.

The Contractual CorporationFounded on Consent-Strengths and
Weaknesses

Brudney and Clark both offer valid criticisms. But despite the
success of their respective critiques, neither renders the nexus of
contracts concept irrelevant to corporate law. Brudney and Clark
both look to practice to show the model's weaknesses, but practice
may also show its strengths.
The liberal association of contractual consent and human freedom is inherently flawed as a universal theory of business relationships, but as a practical matter, seems valid in the context of discrete
contracts. Management corporations, viewed contractually, represent complexes of both discrete and relational contracts. 2 2 1 Institutional stock and bondholders, for example, buy and sell securities
on the open market, taking short term positions. As both Brudney
and Clark point out, different investors have different expectations,
but all depend on management. On the other hand, institutional
investors going in and out of positions in given corporations enter
into these contractual relations through discrete, arm's length transactions and maintain short term expectations. Investors can protect
themselves through diversification and quickly exit. 2 22 These investor-corporate relations have a real individual and self-reliant aspect.
The same self-protective patterns obtain respecting many individual
investors. Trustee-beneficiary relations and their governing law are
by no means strictly analogous, and the values embodied in classical
contract law have relevance. The discrete values these investors
bring to these relationships may be read back into their initial manifestations of assent.
The new economic theory offers a theoretical exploration of
these discrete aspects of practical corporate relations. It illuminates
arm's-length points only dimly recognized in academic corporate
work of the anti-managerialist variety. It thereby begins to explain
the strains of corporate doctrine that persistently refuse to apply the
fiduciary principle. The new theorists' vast overstatement of theircase through their insistence on a discrete contractual model across
the board does not vitiate their contribution.
Even the overstated, absolutely discrete contractual model
makes a positive contribution at a purely theoretical level. Brudney
and Clark both correctly assert that the theory does not translate to
220
221
222

Brudney, supra note 8, at 1415 n.31; Clark, supra note 8, at 65.
See supra text accompanying note 32.
See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 105.
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practice. The "contract" and the "consent" do not really exist, and
corporate "contracts" are in large measure positive law constructs.
But, despite this fundamental objection, the new theory remains attractive to a liberal observer, even one familiar with corporate practice. In liberal theory, legitimating contracts need not be actual.
Liberals caught between respect for individual autonomy and recognition of the need for a coercive sovereign routinely surmount the
difficulty by employing contractarian paradigms of the formation of
the sovereign. These collective contracts legitimate social arrangements through constructive consent. They never refer to individual
behavior. Instead, they assume that all autonomously acting individuals in the larger social unit have a set of common characteristics.
This allows predictions as to whether individuals would consent to a
particular institutional arrangement. They assign the actor the trait
of rationality in determining the direction taken by this free choice.
Justice then depends on whether those subject to the arrangement
2 23
would choose it freely ex ante.
Many in American legal culture practice this mode of contractarian legitimation. Not surprisingly, artfully constructed applications of it to large corporate bureaucracies resonate well within
that culture.
But the new economic theory's picture of liberal-utilitarian concord holds validity only in theory, and even the theoretical construct
depends on rational economic actors denuded of significant human
characteristics. 2 24 As a result, its hypothetical bargaining inadequately captures the social reality real people face.
Legal scholarship adopting the new economic theory takes different approaches to the problems of practical application. Some
legal scholars applying the neoclassical variant simply ignore the
problem. This work collapses theory into practice, treating all contracts, discrete or collective, actual or constructive, as if similarly
constituted. 2 25 The work nicely manifests liberal theoretical as223

This model of the liberal's method is drawn from Rosenfeld, supra note 128, at

817-18.
224

See Carlson, supra note 209, at 1361-68.

See supra the materials cited notes 54, 91; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at
283-86 (arguing against the expost interpolation of dissolution rights and fiduciary duties
in close corporation situations because "there will be situations where all parties decide
that they are better off without them."); cf Fama, supra note 42, at 293 (suggesting that
subordinates monitor superiors), but see Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 584 n.4.
The neoclassical tendency to justify existing arrangements as efficient market solutions (see, e.g., Baysinger & Butler, supra note 5, at 561, 564-66) has led to a whole body
of literature justifying corporate governance arrangements as they appeared around
1980. Awkwardly, corporate governance practices changed dramatically around 1984.
See Bratton, supra note 3, at 1520-21.
225
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sumptions. It less successfully explains corporate doctrine composed of complexes of relational values.
Legal scholarship in the institutional variant encounters fewer
practical problems. Institutional actors better approximate real
people. Even so, the institutionalists manage to deploy their actor
and at the same time satisfy the liberal goal of noninterference by
the sovereign. Institutional actors understand their own failings and
erect contract structures around them. Their success in erecting
these structures makes state intervention into corporate relationships unjustifiable. They recognize communal values, but only as
contracting strategies designed as means to individualist ends.
This rendition of liberal values in an imperfect world of transactions is attractive. But it omits too much from the picture to afford a
basis for a reconstructed corporate doctrine. The imperfect institutional actor always remains the best judge of his or her own best
interests, placing the paradigm outside our sense that individuals
often act other than in their own best interests. The possibility of
such errant conduct, according to Mill, is particularly likely to occur
where the act of consent binds for a long period of time.2 26 Corporate legal doctrine also recognizes this possibility, providing layers
of paternalistic protections for investors. Labelled fiduciary, this
doctrine straddles the corporate complex of discrete and relational
contract, effective and ineffective self-interested action, and selfprotected and dependent positioning. Despite all its liberal attractions, the new theory will probably fail to suppress paternalistic impulses of lawmakers and legal scholars. 22 7 These impulses of course
remain dangerous to the freedom of corporate actors2 28-thus the
new economic theory retains an ongoing critical role.
D.

Comments

Placing the "contract" in the "nexus of contracts" concept
against the broad background of corporate doctrine and contract
theory dramatically reduces its heuristic force. One can, as the new
economic theorists assert, account for corporate law contractually.
But one can account for it accurately only by ex post review with an
open concept of contract with broad notions of consent.
226
J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 950, 952-53, 960-61 (Ashley ed.
1921); see Rosenfeld, supra note 128, at 801-02.
227 Compare Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 180, with Kronman, Paternalism and the
Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) (explanations of decisionmaker paternalism in
contracts); see also Bratton, Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapoliticsand Kennedy s Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 871, 903-13 (1985) (discussing both Kennedy and Kronman's

articles).
228

See Kennedy, Paternalism, supra note 180, at 642-49.
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With a more flexible notion of contract, the contract heuristic
can build a theoretical picture that respects corporate practice. Limiting conceptions of the corporate contract, whether discrete or relational, classical or neoclassical, managerialist or individualist,
cause distortions in the theoretical picture. No such limitation
should be privileged. Flexibility helps us better appreciate the
range of values-liberal and communitarian, utilitarian and relational-at stake in corporate law decisions.
CONCLUSION-THEORY AND PRACTICE

Models of the corporation constructed within the new economic theory's limited analytical framework can neither conclusively
explain the firm nor adequately serve as blueprints for an improved,
reconstituted, fully rationalized future firm. Yet the theory has
brought academic corporate law closer to business practice by highlighting the elements of voluntary exchange in corporate relationships. At the same time, the theory has mischaracterized these
corporate contracts, making what amount to political assertions.
The theory's very appearance in legal theory affects practice.
Its proponents advance a perspective that strikes deep political
resonances as it recasts the basic components of received corporate
theory in a classic, sometimes extreme, individualist mode. This
counters a decades old orthodoxy of group orientation in corporate
policy discourse. Thus positioned, the theory can achieve a cognizable practical influence, even though it attracts only a handful of real
adherents, by virtue of its acceptance as a legitimate, respectable
part of legal discourse. This acceptance by itself reshapes prevailing
consciousness regarding management corporations in significant
ways. It changes the ongoing debate about corporate governance,
which often comes down to a "burden of proof" contest between
proponents and opponents of governmental intervention; the contestant imposing the burden on the other side wins. The new economic theory adds weight to the side opposing intervention.
Alterations in business and legal practices may result ultimately
from the new theory's appearance, but they may be more enabled
than dictated by it. Given this variety of practical-theoretical interplay, perhaps the theory has had its greatest influence already. Today, power flows to the theorist who constructs a picture of
corporate power in appropriate "post managerialist" terms.
Whatever the future interplay of theory and power, the concepts that make up theories of the firm-entity and aggregate, contract and concession, public and private, discrete and relationalwill stay in internal opposition. This tendency toward contradiction
should be accepted, not feared. The contradictions are intrinsic.
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No foreseeable scholarship or legislative reform will resolve them.
The contradictions also are wholesome. Studying and reflecting on
their interplay in the law enhances our positive and normative understanding. Legal theories that heavily privilege one or another
opposing concept risk positive error. Theory, instead of denying
the existence of the contradictions, should synchronize their coexistence in law.
From this it follows that corporate doctrine is a necessary referent for a legal theory of the firm. The doctrine provides an authentic source for a positive theory-a source providing a useful
counterweight to economic theory. The doctrine follows from practice. It is a residue of corporate life filtered through and written out
by corporate lawyers. It mediates between opposing theoretical
conceptions. It privileges different concepts at different points, but
unlike academic theory, it never does so absolutely. Studying the
doctrine offers a sense of how contradictory theory of the firm concepts are synchronized in practice.

